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Time to Bury the Shocks the Conscience Test 
Rosalie Berger Levinson* 
The Supreme Court has acknowledged that “the Due Process 
Clause, like its forebear in the Magna Carta, was ‘intended to 
secure the individual from the arbitrary exercise of the powers of 
government’ . . . to prevent governmental power from being ‘used 
for purposes of oppression.’” 1  Historically, Magna Carta was 
aimed at limiting the power of the king.  Today, substantive due 
process is invoked to challenge arbitrary deprivations of life, 
liberty, and property by officials, such as police officers, jail 
guards, public-school educators, public employers, and members 
of zoning boards.  However, the Supreme Court has emasculated 
its efficacy as a limitation on executive power.  In 1998, in County 
of Sacramento v. Lewis, it held that the “criteria to identify what 
is fatally arbitrary differ depending on whether it is legislation or 
a specific act of a governmental officer that is at issue.” 2  Whereas 
legislative enactments are subject to varying levels of scrutiny 
depending on the nature of the rights at stake, the Court asserted 
that only the most egregious executive misconduct, that which 
“shocks the conscience,” will be actionable.3 
Since 1998, Lewis has created significant confusion and 
division in the appellate courts, severely restricting the ability of 
detainees, students, government employees, and landowners, to 
bring substantive due process challenges to the arbitrary exercise 
of power.  Some circuits have required that litigants prove that 
executive misconduct both infringe on a fundamental right and 
shock the conscience.  Because neither employment nor property 
are regarded as fundamental rights, most allegations of arbitrary 
treatment brought by government employees and landowners are 
dismissed.  Other appellate courts allow substantive due process 
challenges to the deprivation of non-fundamental property or 
liberty interests only where the litigant demonstrates the 
inadequacy of state law remedies, thereby permitting the vagaries 
of state tort law to determine the fate of constitutional claims.  
* Phyllis and Richard Duesenberg Professor of Law, Valparaiso University School of 
Law. 
 1 Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986) (citations omitted). 
 2 County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846 (1998). 
 3 Id. 
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Further, the appellate courts have interpreted the “shocks the 
conscience” test to impose a draconian standard, mandating, for 
example, that detainees demonstrate unnecessary and wanton 
infliction of pain or that students prove intentional malice or 
sadism in order to challenge excessive, unwarranted corporal 
punishment. 
The thesis of this Article is that the “shocks the conscience” 
test, which is founded on a false dichotomy between substantive 
due process challenges to executive and legislative action, should 
be rejected.  First, it is historically untenable.  The core concern of 
Magna Carta, the source of substantive due process, was to limit 
executive abuse of power.  This was the understanding of those 
who framed and ratified the Due Process Clause.  Thus, it is 
counterintuitive to make it more difficult for plaintiffs to 
challenge executive misconduct.  Second, Lewis rests on shaky 
precedent and has not been consistently adhered to by the 
Supreme Court in subsequent cases.  Third, the concern cited by 
the Court to justify a more stringent standard for executive 
action—fear of converting § 1983 substantive due process claims 
into a “font of tort law”—is unfounded and exaggerated.  Section 
1983 should not drive constitutional interpretation, and 
immunity defenses already significantly insulate government 
officials and entities sued for § 1983 damages.  Fourth, the 
numerous circuit conflicts demonstrate that the test has proven to 
be an unworkable analytical tool. 
To restore substantive due process as a meaningful safeguard 
against arbitrary abuse of government power, Lewis should be 
overturned.  Recognizing, however, the concerns of subjectivity 
and unbridled discretion that have surrounded the substantive 
due process conundrum, this Article proposes a new test with 
specific criteria, extrapolated from various Supreme Court and 
appellate court decisions, to guide courts in determining when 
government misconduct should be viewed as an unconstitutional 
abuse of power. 
INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court has recognized substantive due process 
as a limitation on all three branches of government—legislative, 
executive, and judicial.  In the nineteenth century, substantive 
due process was invoked to strike down laws that interfered with 
economic liberty.4  Although the Supreme Court subsequently 
 4 In Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589 (1897), the Court held that a state 
statute restricting property owners from obtaining insurance from companies that failed 
to comply with state law interfered with the liberty of the individual “to earn his 
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repudiated the close scrutiny to which the Lochner Court 
subjected economic legislation, the concept that substantive due 
process protects against arbitrary legislation remains intact.  
Under economic substantive due process, laws need only be 
“rationally related to a legitimate state interest.”5  The 
challenger has the burden to prove that the legislature “acted in 
an arbitrary and irrational way.”6  However, when a statute 
interferes with certain personal rights heightened scrutiny is 
used.  Under the classic formulation, when a right is classified as 
fundamental, the state carries the burden of proving that 
infringement of the right is narrowly tailored to meet a 
compelling government interest.7  Further, the Court has at 
times invalidated laws that interfere with non-fundamental, but 
core, liberty interests by imposing an undue burden test8 or a 
balancing test.9 
livelihood by any lawful calling.”  Allgeyer was the forerunner of Lochner v. New York, 198 
U.S. 45 (1905), which invalidated on substantive due process grounds a New York law 
prohibiting the employment of bakers for more than ten hours per day or sixty hours per 
week. Id. at 52.  The historic source for substantive due process is discussed, infra Part 
II.A. 
 5 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985) (explaining 
the deferential standard that applies to economic legislation). 
 6 Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 15 (1976). 
 7 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997).  In his concurring opinion, 
Justice Souter cites Justice Harlan’s dissent in Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) 
(Harlan, J., dissenting), as providing the basis for the modern doctrine of substantive due 
process and unenumerated personal rights. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 762–63 (Souter, J., 
concurring). 
 8 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 874 (1992) (holding that 
substantive due process prohibits state regulation that unduly burdens the abortion 
decision). 
 9 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (holding that public morality alone 
could not justify a state sodomy statute targeting only same-sex conduct, which intruded 
“into the personal and private life of the individual”).  Lawrence has created a circuit split 
as to the appropriate standard of review to apply when a liberty interest in sexual 
intimacy is implicated.  It has also created conflicting opinions as to whether public 
morality may justify laws that intrude on this personal liberty interest. See, e.g., 
Seegmiller v. LaVerkin City, 528 F.3d 762, 771–72 (10th Cir. 2008) (holding that 
Lawrence did not recognize a broad-based fundamental right to engage in sexual conduct, 
but rather applied only rational basis analysis and, under this standard, private 
reprimand of female officer for off-duty private sexual conduct with another officer at a 
training conference does not violate substantive due process); Cook v. Gates, 528 F.3d 42, 
56 (1st Cir. 2008) (acknowledging that some courts have read Lawrence to apply a 
rational basis test while others see the case as mandating strict scrutiny, but then 
interpreting Lawrence as having recognized a protected liberty interest for adults to 
engage in private, consensual sexual intimacy, which triggered a balancing test that 
cannot fit neatly under either strict or rational basis analysis); Witt v. Dep’t of Air Force, 
527 F.3d 806, 819, 821 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that Lawrence mandates application of a 
heightened level of scrutiny to the claim of Air Force nurse alleging that defendants 
violated her substantive due process rights by suspending her from duty because of her 
sexual relationship with a civilian woman; although rejecting a facial challenge to the 
military’s “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy, the court remanded for heightened scrutiny of the 
policy “as applied” to the plaintiff); Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle, 517 F.3d 738, 743–
45 (5th Cir. 2008) (holding that, after Lawrence, an interest in public morality is 
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In addition, the Supreme Court has invoked substantive due 
process to limit “grossly excessive” punitive damage awards 
imposed by the judicial branch of government.10  Despite the fact 
that property, not fundamental liberty, is at stake, such awards 
have been deemed to violate a defendant’s substantive due 
process right not to be arbitrarily deprived of one’s property.11  
The Court established a three-prong test for arbitrariness, 
looking to the reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct (the 
most important consideration), the ratio between compensatory 
and punitive damages (which rarely should exceed single digits), 
and fines/punishments for the same conduct under state law.12 
As to the executive branch, the Supreme Court in 1952 
recognized that substantive due process protects against 
wrongdoing by government officials.  In Rochin v. California,13 
the Court invoked substantive due process defensively in a 
criminal proceeding to exclude evidence that was obtained by 
pumping the defendant’s stomach.14  The Court stated that 
substantive due process is violated by conduct that “shocks the 
conscience” or constitutes force that is “brutal” and “offend[s] 
even hardened sensibilities.”15  The shocks the conscience 
standard appeared to emerge as the test for determining whether 
misconduct by government officials was so egregious as to violate 
substantive due process.16 
In 1998, the Supreme Court, in County of Sacramento v. 
Lewis,17 invoked Rochin’s shocks the conscience test to limit the 
availability of a § 1983 damage action brought against a deputy 
insufficient to justify laws that regulate private sexual conduct, unless it relates to 
prostitution, the potential for injury or coercion or public conduct; thus, state ban on the 
promotion or commercial sale of sex toys is invalid “[b]ecause the asserted governmental 
interests for the law does not meet the applicable constitutional standard announced in 
Lawrence v. Texas”); Williams v. Morgan, 478 F.3d 1316, 1320 (11th Cir. 2007) (holding, 
contrary to the Fifth Circuit, that Alabama’s interest in public morality is a rational 
constitutional justification for the state’s sexual devices statute, which prohibits 
commercial distribution of any device primarily used for stimulation of human genitals); 
Lofton v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 817 (11th Cir. 2004) 
(holding that Lawrence mandates only application of a rational basis standard of review, 
and, under this standard, Florida statute prohibiting adoptions by homosexuals does not 
violate substantive due process). 
 10 BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574–75 (1996). 
 11 Id.  See also State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 412, 418 
(2003) (holding that a $145 million punitive damage award was grossly excessive in a case 
where the jury awarded only $1 million in compensatory damages). 
 12 State Farm, 538 U.S. at 418.  See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:  
PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 596–99 (3d ed. 2006) (discussing the procedural and 
substantive due process limits the Court has imposed on punitive damages awards). 
 13 342 U.S. 165 (1952). 
 14 Id. at 173–74. 
 15 Id. at 172–73. 
 16 See infra Part I.B. 
 17 523 U.S. 833 (1998). 
Do Not Delete 4/13/2010 9:20 PM 
2010] Time to Bury the Shocks the Conscience Test 311 
sheriff who conducted a deadly high-speed chase of two young 
boys riding a motorcycle after they failed to obey an officer’s 
command to stop.18  The Court asserted that, although 
substantive due process may be used to challenge abuses of 
executive power, the criteria for such challenges are different 
from challenges to legislation—they must be limited to the most 
egregious official conduct.19  To guard against converting 
substantive due process into a “font of tort law,” only an abuse of 
power that shocks the conscience is actionable.20 
Lewis has led to significant confusion in the appellate courts.  
Because the Court imposed a unique test for abuses of executive 
power, some appellate courts have rejected substantive due 
process challenges, even where fundamental rights are 
implicated, unless the plaintiff can further prove that the 
government action was “conscience-shocking.”21  Thus, those 
injured by egregious government wrongdoing must prove both a 
fundamental right and conscience-shocking behavior in order to 
state a cause of action.  This restriction has eliminated 
substantive due process in many circuits as a source of protection 
from arbitrary employment decisions or land use decisions that 
implicate only non-fundamental property or liberty interests.22  
Further, even with regard to fundamental rights, the shocks the 
conscience standard has been interpreted to limit claims to only 
the most egregious misconduct “inspired by malice or sadism.”23 
This Article contends that the Supreme Court took a wrong 
turn in Lewis when it held that substantive due process claims 
brought against the executive branch must be subjected to a 
different, more rigorous standard than challenges to legislative 
or judicial abuses of power.  Part I of this Article describes the 
birth of the shocks the conscience test and its history from 
Rochin in 1952 until Lewis in 1998, as well as the appellate 
courts’ conflicting interpretations of Lewis, which demonstrate 
that the test has proved to be an unworkable analytic tool.  Part 
II critiques Lewis and explains how the case created a false 
dichotomy between challenges to legislative versus executive 
action and imposed an unwarranted standard on those 
challenging executive misconduct.  It describes how the 
dichotomy is contrary to public originalism and to Supreme 
Court precedent, both before and after Lewis.  Further, it 
 18 Id. at 836–37, 854. 
 19 Id. at 846. 
 20 Id. at 846–48. 
 21 See infra Part I.D. 
 22 See infra Part I.D. 
 23 See infra Part I.D. 
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challenges the underlying rationale for the test.  Part III 
proposes a new test for analyzing challenges to executive power 
that draws on the Supreme Court’s treatment of substantive due 
process challenges to legislation and punitive damage awards, as 
well as the appellate courts’ interpretation of the shocks the 
conscience test. 
I.  THE BIRTH AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE SHOCKS THE 
CONSCIENCE TEST 
A. Stomach Pumping to Secure Evidence Shocks the Conscience 
The Supreme Court first utilized the shocks the conscience 
language in a 1952 decision holding that a conviction based on 
the use of morphine capsules, which were obtained by pumping 
the defendant’s stomach to induce vomiting, violated the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.24  The Court did 
not draw a distinction between using substantive due process to 
challenge legislative as compared to executive action.  Nor did 
the Court state that only executive misconduct that shocks the 
conscience violates substantive due process.  Rather, the case 
must be understood in the context in which it was decided. 
In 1952, the Supreme Court Justices were engaged in a 
battle as to whether the provisions in the Bill of Rights, more 
specifically the criminal procedural safeguards in the Fourth, 
Fifth, and Sixth Amendments, applied to the states through the 
Fourteenth Amendment.25  Justice Frankfurter, who authored 
the Rochin opinion, did not believe that the framers of the 
Amendment intended for it to incorporate these specific 
guarantees.  Rather, he argued that substantive due process 
protected against any practices that “offend those canons of 
decency and fairness which express the notions of justice of 
English-speaking peoples even toward those charged with the 
most heinous offenses.”26  Justices Black and Douglas concurred 
in the judgment that the evidence so obtained must be excluded, 
but they relied instead on the explicit Fifth Amendment Self-
Incrimination Clause, which they believed applied equally to the 
states.27  Justice Black attacked Justice Frankfurter’s use of 
 24 Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 174 (1952). 
 25 In Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833), the Supreme Court held that 
the provision in the Bill of Rights applied only to the federal government and not to state 
or local governments.  For a history regarding the debate as to whether the Fourteenth 
Amendment Privileges and Immunities Clause or the Due Process Clause was intended to 
incorporate the first eight amendments, see CHEMERINSKY, supra note 12, at 491–503. 
 26 Rochin, 342 U.S. at 169 (citing Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 416–17 
(1945)). 
 27 Id. at 174–79 (Black, J., and Douglas, J., concurring). 
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substantive due process as lacking fixed content, thereby 
permitting the Justices to impose their own personal 
predilections of what offends “a sense of justice” or what runs 
counter to the “decencies of civilized conduct.”28  He challenged 
“the evanescent standards of the majority’s philosophy” as no 
different from that used during the Lochner period to nullify 
state laws enacted to suppress evil economic practices.29 
To justify his use of substantive due process, rather than an 
“incorporated” Fifth Amendment, Justice Frankfurter conceded 
that substantive due process lacked specificity, but he protested 
that “[t]he vague contours of the Due Process Clause do not leave 
judges at large.”30  He believed that judges would be guided by 
“considerations deeply rooted in reason and in the compelling 
traditions of the legal profession.”31  It is in this context that he 
stated that conduct that “shocks the conscience” or “is bound to 
offend even hardened sensibilities” clearly violates the due 
process requirement that states “respect certain decencies of 
civilized conduct.”32  Justice Frankfurter used the shocks the 
conscience language, among many other descriptive clauses, to 
establish that judges may legitimately invoke substantive due 
process to reach practices that “offend the community’s sense of 
fair play and decency.”33 
Significantly, the Justices did not treat Rochin’s claim as a 
substantive due process challenge to executive action.  Rochin 
challenged the “state rule” that permitted evidence to be 
introduced despite the fact that it was obtained through coercive 
means.  Indeed, Justice Douglas, in his concurring opinion, 
questioned how a “rule” that the majority of states followed, 
which permitted evidence to be used to convict even if it was 
forcibly extracted, could be viewed as contrary to established 
tradition.34  Although Justice Frankfurter focused on the conduct 
at issue in rejecting the state’s evidentiary rule, his opinion did 
not draw a distinction between substantive due process 
challenges to executive as compared to legislative action.  As the 
 28 Id. at 175 (Black, J., concurring).  Justice Douglas similarly opined that inquiry 
into “decencies of civilized conduct” permits determinations to turn “on the idiosyncrasies 
of the judges who sit here.” Id. at 179 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
 29 Id. at 177. 
 30 Id. at 170. 
 31 Id. at 171.  He also asserted that the judicial exercise of judgment should not be 
avoided by “freezing ‘due process of law’ at some fixed stage of time or thought”; rather, 
judges must reconcile the needs “both of continuity and of change in a progressive 
society.” Id. at 171–72. 
 32 Id. at 172–73. 
 33 Id. at 173. 
 34 Id. at 177–78 (Douglas, J., concurring) (noting that evidence so obtained would be 
excluded in only four states). 
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concurrence noted: “What the majority hold is that the Due 
Process Clause empowers this Court to nullify any state law if its 
application ‘shocks the conscience,’ offends ‘a sense of justice’ or 
runs counter to the ‘decencies of civilized conduct.’”35  The 
majority gave no citation to its use of shocks the conscience 
language, nor did it state that this is the test that must be used.  
Rather, this was merely descriptive language, explaining why 
admitting the ill-begotten morphine capsules to obtain a 
conviction violated due process. 
B. Shocks the Conscience from 1952 through 1998 
Over the next forty-six years, from 1952 until the Lewis 
decision in 1998, the shocks the conscience language from Rochin 
was utilized in only a handful of majority opinions.  The Supreme 
Court did not distinguish legislative from executive misconduct, 
nor did it consistently invoke the shocks the conscience test.  The 
three key cases that Lewis relied upon did not support its 
analysis.  The first, Breithaupt v. Abram, applied the shocks the 
conscience standard in rejecting a habeas petition challenging a 
police mandate that a physician collect an evidentiary blood 
sample of an unconscious arrestee.36  In rejecting the substantive 
due process claim, the Court explained that numerous states had 
laws permitting this practice.37  The Court focused on a 
legislative rule, which it found did not violate substantive due 
process. 
A second case, United States v. Salerno, considered a 
substantive due process challenge to the pretrial provisions of the 
Bail Reform Act of 1984.38  The Court cited both Rochin’s shocks 
the conscience standard and fundamental rights analysis: 
“substantive due process prevents the government from engaging 
in conduct that shocks the conscience, or interferes with rights 
implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.”39  The case clearly 
involved a challenge to legislative action, not executive 
misconduct.  Rochin was simply invoked as an alternative way to 
prove a substantive due process violation where fundamental 
rights were not implicated. 
The third case cited to support the Lewis analysis, 
Youngberg v. Romeo, more clearly involved a challenge to 
executive action.  However, the Supreme Court in Youngberg did 
not even mention Rochin, nor did it use the shocks the conscience 
 35 Id. at 175 (Black, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
 36 Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 436–37 (1957). 
 37 Id. at 436, 437 nn.3–4. 
 38 United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 741 (1987). 
 39 Id. at 746 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
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standard.40  The case raised the substantive due process rights of 
those who have been involuntarily committed to state 
institutions.41  Although recognizing that the decisions of 
qualified professionals regarding the treatment and conditions of 
confinement should be deemed presumptively valid, the Court 
acknowledged that the liberty interest required the state “to 
provide minimally adequate or reasonable training to ensure 
safety and freedom from undue restraint.”42  Balancing the 
competing concerns, the Court held that substantive due process 
is violated if professional decisions constitute “such a substantial 
departure from accepted professional judgment, practice, or 
standards as to demonstrate that the person responsible actually 
did not base the decision on such a judgment.”43  The Court did 
not mandate that arbitrary professional decisions shock the 
conscience in order to be actionable. 
An analysis of every Supreme Court citation to Rochin from 
1952 to 1998 demonstrates that, outside the context of the 
evidentiary exclusionary rule,44 the shocks the conscience test 
was cited much more frequently in dissenting opinions,45 often 
rejected,46 and strongly criticized.47  It was never considered to be 
 40 Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 315 (1982). 
 41 Id. at 309. 
 42 Id. at 318–19. 
 43 Id. at 323. 
 44 See Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 631–32 (1965) (stating that the “shocks the 
conscience” test is used to determine whether evidence must be excluded).  See also 
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 259 n.14 (1983) (White, J., concurring) (reasoning that 
evidence obtained as part of a search that “shocks the conscience” must be excluded based 
on due process). 
 45 See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 435–37 (1993) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) 
(opining that the majority’s explanation for failing to address the substantive due process 
“shocks the conscience” argument was “fatuous” and arguing that substantive due process 
permits defendants to make a claim of actual innocence); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 
578 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court should have found that 
requiring pretrial detainees to submit to a visual body cavity search after a contact visit 
“shocks the conscience”); Shotwell Mfg. Co. v. United States, 371 U.S. 341, 378–79 (1963) 
(Black, J., dissenting) (reasoning, in dissent, that allowing a highly ranked government 
actor to induce confessions “shocks the conscience”).  Cf. Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191, 
193, 201 (1957) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (arguing for application of the “shocks the 
conscience” test to the confession of an African-American defendant of below-average 
intelligence after several days of questioning, but ultimately determining that the conduct 
in question did not shock the conscience). 
 46 See Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271, 275 (1994) (holding that arrestee’s 
malicious prosecution claim must be judged under the Fourth Amendment, not 
substantive due process with its “scarce and open-ended” “guideposts”); Graham v. 
Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393–94 (1989) (rejecting use of the “shocks the conscience” 
substantive due process test where a more explicit constitutional right was at stake); 
Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 327 (1986) (relying on the Eighth Amendment, rather 
than substantive due process, in a challenge to conditions of confinement, although 
mentioning that conduct which “shocks the conscience” would likely violate both 
provisions); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 663–66 (1961) (Black, J., concurring) (explicitly 
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the only standard for challenging executive misconduct,48 nor 
was it viewed as supplanting fundamental rights analysis.49 
C. Lewis Adopts “Shocks the Conscience” as the Exclusive Test 
to Assess Substantive Due Process Challenges to Executive 
Misconduct 
In 1998, the Supreme Court, in County of Sacramento v. 
Lewis, addressed a substantive due process challenge in the 
context of a § 1983 damages action.50  At issue was the alleged 
reckless conduct of a deputy sheriff who conducted a deadly high-
speed chase of two boys riding a motorcycle after they failed to 
obey an officer’s command to stop.51  Phillip Lewis, the 
rejecting the “shocks the conscience” test in favor of a “liberally construed” reading of the 
Fourth and Fifth Amendments). 
 47 Herrera, 506 U.S. at 428 (Scalia, J., concurring) (opining that if convicting a 
defendant using proper procedures “shocks the conscience” of the dissenting Justices, they 
may want to reconsider the usefulness of the “shocks the conscience” test); Carlson v. 
Green, 446 U.S. 14, 46 n.12 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (lamenting that the “shocks 
the conscience” test imposes a constitutional standard “sufficiently general that it is 
difficult to predict in advance whether a particular set of facts amounts to a constitutional 
violation”); McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 225–26 (1971) (Black, J., concurring) 
(reasoning that conviction should be reversed if rights written in the Constitution are 
violated, not if members of the Court believe the procedures were “shocking to [their] 
conscience”); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 381–82 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting) (discussing 
how the “shocks the conscience” test gives the judiciary wide latitude to declare laws 
unconstitutional and disregards the concept of a government of limited power); Sniadach 
v. Family Fin. Corp. of Bay View, 395 U.S. 337, 350–51 (1969) (Black, J., dissenting) 
(citing the “shocks the conscience” test as an example of a “natural law” test that the 
Court uses to set its own subjective standards); Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440, 450 
(1969) (Black, J., dissenting) (arguing that the “shocks the conscience” test invites the 
Court to make its own rules based on personal opinions of individual Justices); Tinker v. 
Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 519–20 (1969) (Black, J., dissenting) 
(citing the “shocks the conscience” test as an example of a flexible standard that gives the 
Court no guidance as to when it should find a law unconstitutional); Griswold v. 
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 511 n.4, 512 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting) (citing the “shocks 
the conscience” test as an example of the phrase used to decide cases based on judicial 
“appraisal of what laws are unwise or unnecessary”); Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 407 
(1964) (Black, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part) (citing the “shocks the 
conscience” test as one that impermissibly gives the Justices wide discretion to strike 
down laws). 
 48 In addition to the Youngberg decision, discussed, supra notes 40–43 and 
accompanying text, see Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 417–18, 433–34 (1986), where the 
majority used the language “shocks the sensibilities of civilized society” to determine that 
the police behavior in not making defendant aware that an attorney had been retained on 
his behalf prior to questioning did not violate this standard.  The dissent found that, even 
if the conduct was not deemed to be conscience-shocking, the circumstances surrounding 
the defendant’s confession were not fair and thus violated due process. Id. at 466–68 
(Stevens, J., dissenting).  See also United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 432 (1973) 
(using a standard, which it referred to as “shocking to the universal sense of justice,” but 
concluding that it did not shock this universal sense of justice for a police officer to 
infiltrate a drug ring to obtain evidence). 
 49 See supra notes 38–39 and accompanying text (discussing Salerno). 
 50 County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 836 (1998). 
 51 Id. at 836–37. 
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passenger, was struck and killed.52  The Court confirmed that 
substantive due process could be used to challenge abuses of 
executive power: “Since the time of our early explanations of due 
process, we have understood the core of the concept to be 
protection against arbitrary action . . . .”53  The majority 
cautioned, however, that the “criteria to identify what is fatally 
arbitrary differ depending on whether it is legislation or a 
specific act of a governmental officer that is at issue.”54  With 
regard to the latter, only “the most egregious official conduct can 
be said to be ‘arbitrary in the constitutional sense.’”55  The Court 
then invoked Rochin to rule that only an abuse of power that 
“shocks the conscience” will be actionable.56 
In Lewis, the Court further refined the Rochin test.  It 
reasoned that government officials who act with “deliberate 
indifference” to constitutional rights “shock the conscience”—
citing, for example, prison guards who are deliberately 
indifferent to the medical needs of pretrial detainees.57  However, 
because deliberate indifference implies the opportunity for actual 
deliberation, the Court determined that the standard could not 
reasonably apply to police officers who face a situation calling for 
fast action.  Thus, the Court held that injuries resulting from 
“high-speed chases with no intent to harm suspects physically or 
to worsen their legal plight do not give rise to liability under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.”58  Because the deceased’s family 
members did not allege that the deputy acted with intent to 
harm, they failed to meet the shocks the conscience test.59 
Of key concern to this discussion is the Court’s assertion that 
substantive due process challenges to executive misconduct must 
be treated differently than challenges to legislation.  As noted, 
when laws allegedly violate due process, the standard of review 
depends on the threshold determination of whether the 
legislative enactment infringes on a fundamental right.60  In 
Washington v. Glucksberg,61 the Court stated that this inquiry 
must be made “before requiring more than a reasonable relation 
to a legitimate state interest to justify the action.”62  Only 
 52 Id. at 837. 
 53 Id. at 845–46. 
 54 Id. at 846. 
 55 Id. (quoting Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 129 (1992)). 
 56 Id. 
 57 Id. at 851–52. 
 58 Id. at 854. 
 59 Id. at 855. 
 60 See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
 61 521 U.S. 702 (1997). 
 62 Id. at 722. 
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fundamental rights or liberty interests “deeply rooted in this 
Nation’s history and tradition” or “implicit in the concept of 
ordered liberty” will trigger strict scrutiny analysis.63 
With regard to claims of executive misconduct, the Supreme 
Court has never clearly articulated how this fundamental rights 
inquiry affects the analysis.64  Obviously, the importance of the 
right will inform the shocks the conscience judgment because 
deprivation of a fundamental liberty interest will be more likely 
to upset our sensibilities.  However, the Court has never ruled 
that without a fundamental right all judicial inquiry must 
cease.65 
In Lewis, Justice Souter recognized the inherent conflict 
between Glucksberg, which begins its analysis by asking whether 
a fundamental right is implicated, and the analysis in Lewis, 
which asks whether executive misconduct shocks the 
conscience.66  Specifically, he explained in a footnote: 
[E]xecutive action challenges raise a particular need to preserve the 
constitutional proportions of constitutional claims, lest the 
Constitution be demoted to what we have called a font of tort law.  
Thus, in a due process challenge to executive action, the threshold 
question is whether the behavior of the governmental officer is so 
egregious, so outrageous, that it may fairly be said to shock the 
contemporary conscience.  That judgment may be informed by a 
history of liberty protection, but it necessarily reflects an 
understanding of traditional executive behavior, of contemporary 
practice, and of the standards of blame generally applied to them.  
Only if the necessary condition of egregious behavior were satisfied 
would there be a possibility of recognizing a substantive due process 
right to be free of such executive action, and only then might there be 
 63 Id. at 720–21 (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
 64 In Rochin, the Court invoked the shocks the conscience test without first 
identifying a fundamental right. See supra Part I.A. 
 65 In Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 722, the Court described the “threshold requirement—
that a challenged state action implicate a fundamental right—before requiring more than 
a reasonable relation to a legitimate state interest to justify the action.”  The Court did 
not rule that the absence of a fundamental right ends the constitutional inquiry.  Rather, 
this simply means that the government action will be tested by a lower level of scrutiny. 
Id.  Even Justice Scalia, an outspoken critic of substantive due process, acknowledged 
that laws not implicating a fundamental right are subject to “the ordinary ‘rational 
relationship’ test.” See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 131 (1989).  Further, the 
text of the Fourteenth Amendment does not say that government cannot deprive persons 
of a “fundamental right;” rather, it prohibits all deprivations of “life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.  The Court has acknowledged 
that the scope of “liberty” is broad:  “[A] rational continuum which . . . includes a freedom 
from all substantial arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints . . . .” Poe v. Ullman, 
367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 66 County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846 (1998). 
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a debate about the sufficiency of historical examples of enforcement of 
the right claimed, or its recognition in other ways.67 
Under Justice Souter’s approach, the question whether 
particular behavior shocks the conscience would depend in part 
on a historical review of traditional executive practices.  
However, this analysis does not appear to mandate further 
inquiry into the fundamental nature of the right.  As held in 
Rochin, which Justice Souter affirmed as binding precedent, 
conscience-shocking behavior that deprives a person of liberty 
itself violates substantive due process.68 
Several Justices in Lewis questioned the new dichotomy 
between executive and legislative action.  Justice Kennedy, in a 
concurring opinion, acknowledged that the challenged action—
conducting a reckless high-speed chase—implicated an explicit 
fundamental liberty interest because a life was lost.69  He 
asserted that the shocks the conscience test “can be used to mark 
the beginning point in asking whether or not the objective 
character of certain conduct is consistent with our traditions, 
precedents, and historical understanding of the Constitution and 
its meaning.”70  His major concern was that, regardless of 
whether a plaintiff challenges legislative or executive action, 
“objective considerations, including history and precedent, are 
the controlling principle.”71 
Justice Scalia questioned why substantive due process 
“protects some liberties against executive officers but not against 
legislatures.”72  He opined that Justice Souter’s approach would 
result in greater, not lesser, substantive due process protection 
against the actions of executive officers than against the actions 
of legislatures, apparently because he believed the “threshold 
question” of egregiousness would overwhelm any consideration of 
the historical inquiry, thus abandoning the strict fundamental-
rights approach articulated in Glucksberg.73 
The various opinions in Lewis have led the appellate courts 
to disagree about whether the shocks the conscience standard 
replaces the fundamental rights analysis set forth in Glucksberg, 
or whether the standard supplements the historical inquiry into 
the nature of the asserted liberty interest, as Justice Kennedy’s 
 67 Id. at 848 n.8. 
 68 See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172–74 (1952); Lewis, 523 U.S. at 846–47. 
 69 Lewis, 523 U.S. at 856 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  Justice O’Connor joined this 
opinion. 
 70 Id. at 857. 
 71 Id. at 858. 
 72 Id. at 861 n.2 (Scalia, J., concurring).  Justice Thomas joined this opinion. 
 73 Id. at 860–61 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
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concurrence suggests.74  Several different perspectives have 
emerged in the appellate courts. 
D. Appellate Courts’ Conflicting Interpretations of Lewis 
Lewis’ shocks the conscience test has proven to be an 
unworkable analytical tool.  It has led to circuit splits on several 
issues.  The appellate courts are divided as to whether only 
violations of fundamental rights, as opposed to non-fundamental 
liberty or property interests, are actionable.  They also disagree 
as to whether the existence of state tort remedies defeats the 
federal cause of action.  Further, there are disputes as to what 
constitutes conscience-shocking behavior, including what “state-
of-mind” requirement should be imposed.  Finally, there is 
uncertainty as to whether the conscience-shocking determination 
is a judge or jury question.  The following sections explicate these 
circuit splits. 
1.  Conduct Must Infringe on a Fundamental Right and 
Shock the Conscience 
The appellate courts have taken various approaches in 
seeking to reconcile the Glucksberg analysis, which first 
examines whether a fundamental right is implicated to 
determine the appropriate standard of review,75 with Lewis, 
which focuses on the egregiousness of the government 
misconduct.  Some appellate courts have ruled that absent a 
fundamental right, no substantive due process claim challenging 
executive action may be brought.  For example, in Christensen v. 
County of Boone, the Seventh Circuit rejected a substantive due 
process claim brought by a couple who complained that they were 
stalked and trailed by an officer in his squad car as a result of a 
personal vendetta.76  Because the couple could not identify a 
fundamental right that was directly and substantially interfered 
with by the officer’s conduct, their substantive due process claim 
failed.77  Similarly, in Flowers v. City of Minneapolis,78 the 
Eighth Circuit rejected claims brought against a police lieutenant 
who directed his officers to conduct a month-long patrol of a 
private residence because he did not like the occupants, who had 
a previous encounter with the police, moving into his 
neighborhood.79  The court held that absent a showing that the 
 74 Id. at 857–58 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 75 See supra notes 61–63 and accompanying text. 
 76 Christensen v. County of Boone, 483 F.3d 454, 461–65 (7th Cir. 2007). 
 77 Id. at 465. 
 78 478 F.3d 869 (8th Cir. 2007). 
 79 Id. at 871–72.  The lieutenant offered a steak dinner for any officer who made an 
arrest leading to the conviction or eviction of anyone living at the residence. Id. 
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misconduct violated a fundamental constitutional right and 
shocked the “contemporary conscience,” no substantive due 
process violation could be asserted.80 
The requirement that conduct infringe on a fundamental 
right has led the majority of appellate courts to reject all claims 
brought by government employees alleging arbitrary demotions, 
suspensions, or terminations.  Government employees who allege 
constructive discharge or injury to future ability to earn a living 
fail to state a substantive due process claim because they cannot 
identify a fundamental property or liberty interest.81  A few 
courts have recognized a very limited right to substantive due 
process review of employment decisions where, for example, the 
government totally prohibits someone from engaging in a 
calling,82 but such claims generally are dismissed.83 
In sharp contrast, the appellate courts, as well as the 
Supreme Court, have permitted substantive due process 
challenges to land use regulation (both legislative and executive), 
 80 Id. at 872–74.  See also Martin v. St. Mary’s Dep’t Soc. Servs., 346 F.3d 502, 511–
12 (4th Cir. 2003) (Traxler, C.J., dissenting) (reasoning that when courts assess whether 
action shocks the conscience they should evaluate whether the action violates a right that 
is rooted in history and tradition; however, because defendants allegedly violated parents’ 
right to custody of their children, a fundamental right was at issue, and the alleged 
conduct would shock the conscience); Nicholas v. Pa. State Univ., 227 F.3d 133, 139–40 
(3d Cir. 2000) (holding that substantive due process is violated only if executive action 
violates a fundamental right and is arbitrary or “shocks the conscience”). 
 81 See Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 234 n.12 (3d Cir. 2006).  See also 
Young v. Twp. of Green Oak, 471 F.3d 674, 684–86 (6th Cir. 2006) (“[a]bsent the 
infringement of some ‘fundamental right’, however, this court has held that ‘the 
termination of public employment does not constitute a denial of substantive due 
process.’”); Silva v. Bieluch, 351 F.3d 1045, 1047 (11th Cir. 2003) (stating that 
employment rights are state-created and not “fundamental” rights protected by the 
Constitution); Nicholas, 227 F.3d at 142–43 (observing that the great majority of 
appellate courts have concluded that a public employee’s interest in continued 
employment is not so “fundamental” as to be protected by substantive due process; thus, 
professor’s property interest in his tenured professorship was not entitled to substantive 
due process protection).  Cf. Seegmiller v. LaVerkin City, 528 F.3d 762, 767–72 (10th Cir. 
2008) (holding that a female officer who was given a private reprimand for off-duty sexual 
conduct with another officer could establish a substantive due process violation either by 
showing that the reprimand violated a fundamental right or by showing that the decision 
was so arbitrary as to shock the conscience; however, the court concluded that Lawrence 
did not recognize a broad-based fundamental right to engage in private sexual conduct, 
and that the decision was not so arbitrary as to violate substantive due process). 
 82 See, e.g., Engquist v. Or. Dep’t of Agric., 478 F.3d 985, 996 (9th Cir. 2007), aff’d on 
other grounds, 128 S. Ct. 2146 (2008) (holding that employee “stated a valid 
claim . . . under substantive due process by alleging that Defendants’ actions prevented 
her from pursuing her profession”). 
 83 See Flowers v. City of Minneapolis, 478 F.3d 869, 874 (8th Cir. 2007) 
(acknowledging a “fundamental right to engage in one’s chosen occupation,” and 
cautioning that the right does not encompass a brief interruption of work in a desired 
occupation, but only the “complete prohibition of the right to engage in a calling;” because 
plaintiffs only alleged that the officers’ action caused some loss of business, their 
substantive due process claim was not actionable). 
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even though property has not been designated a fundamental 
right.84  Further, the Supreme Court’s recognition of substantive 
due process as a limitation on punitive damages awards85—again 
a property interest—draws into question any notion that 
substantive due process reaches only the infringement of a 
fundamental right. 
2.  Substantive Due Process Claims Are Actionable Only 
Where No State Remedies Are Available 
Other appellate courts require that litigants challenging 
executive misconduct demonstrate the inadequacy of state 
remedies in order to maintain a substantive due process claim.  
These courts have focused on the Supreme Court’s concern 
expressed in Lewis that substantive due process not become a 
“font of tort law,” supplanting state law.86  Thus, the Fourth 
Circuit held that “where a claim sounds both in state tort law 
and substantive due process, state tort law is the rule and due 
process the distinct exception.”87  Accordingly, judges should 
recognize a strong presumption against § 1983 substantive due 
process claims that overlap state tort law.88  For example, the 
Fourth Circuit threw out claims brought by parents alleging that 
county fire department personnel violated their trainee son’s 
substantive due process right by conducting a strenuous training 
session outside in extreme heat without bringing water or 
medical supplies, thereby causing the young man’s death.89  
 84 In Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 542 (2005), the Court ruled that 
substantive due process prohibits land regulation that does not rationally advance a 
government interest: “a regulation that fails to serve any legitimate governmental 
objective may be so arbitrary or irrational that it runs afoul of the Due Process Clause.”  
See also Maldonado v. Fontanes, 568 F.3d 263, 272–73 (1st Cir. 2009) (rejecting the 
argument that substantive due process claims are not actionable where only deprivation 
of property is at stake, because “[i]t is the effect on the person from the deprivation of the 
interest in life, liberty, or property which may be shocking to the conscience”); A Helping 
Hand, L.L.C. v. Baltimore County, 515 F.3d 356, 371–73 (4th Cir. 2008) (finding that a 
methadone clinic operator whose facility was shut down pursuant to a county zoning 
ordinance stated a valid substantive due process claim since he had a vested property 
interest); United Artist Theatre Circuit, Inc. v. Twp. of Warrington, 316 F.3d 392, 397 & 
400–02 (3d Cir. 2003) (joining the majority of circuits in holding that landowners who 
challenge executive action must establish that the official’s actions shock the conscience, 
but, then-Judge Alito held that denial of a permit to a theater that refused to pay a very 
high impact fee stated a cause of action under the “shocks the conscience” standard).  Cf. 
Clark v. Bosher, 514 F.3d 107, 112–13 (1st Cir. 2008) (recognizing substantive due process 
challenge to the denial of permits or licenses, the court held that run-of-the-mill land-use 
decisions generally will not rise to the level of behavior that shocks the conscience). 
 85 See supra note 11. 
 86 See supra notes 20 and 67 and accompanying text. 
 87 Waybright v. Frederick County, 528 F.3d 199, 204–06 (4th Cir. 2008). 
 88 Id. 
 89 Id. at 201–03. 
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Because their constitutional claim overlapped with state tort law, 
it was not actionable.90 
Similarly, the Seventh Circuit has ruled that whenever 
substantive due process challenges involve only property, the 
plaintiff must show “either the inadequacy of state law remedies 
or an independent constitutional violation.”91  Thus, government 
employees alleging arbitrary employment decisions92 or 
landowners claiming arbitrary deprivation of their property93 will 
have their claims dismissed unless they can prove that state law 
does not provide them relief.94 
Finally, many courts have rejected substantive due process 
claims brought by students alleging excessive corporal 
punishment where the state provides an adequate remedy.  For 
example, the Fifth Circuit has asserted that so long as the state 
affords an adequate remedy, public students cannot claim denial 
of substantive due process, irrespective of the severity of their 
injuries.95  The Eleventh Circuit has similarly suggested that if a 
remedy may be pursued under state tort law, the federal 
 90 Id. at 205–06. 
 91 Lee v. City of Chicago, 330 F.3d 456, 467 (7th Cir. 2003).  See also Ali v. Ramsdell, 
423 F.3d 810, 814 (8th Cir. 2005) (holding that because state conversion law provided an 
adequate remedy, the claim that officers seized and stole $4,920 while executing a search 
warrant did not state a substantive due process claim). 
 92 See Montgomery v. Stefaniak, 410 F.3d 933, 939 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding that 
absent a violation of another constitutional right or the inadequacy of available state 
remedies, a wrongful termination claim could not be brought under a substantive due 
process theory); Galdikas v. Fagan, 342 F.3d 684, 691 (7th Cir. 2003) (reasoning that even 
if officials acted arbitrarily and irrationally, because state law provided an adequate 
remedy for the violation of state-created contract rights, no substantive due process 
violation may be found).  See also Habhab v. Hon, 536 F.3d 963, 968 (8th Cir. 2008) 
(holding that the plaintiff could not “avail himself of federal constitutional principles of 
substantive due process” to pursue a state law claim for tortious interference with 
contracts). 
 93 See Taake v. County of Monroe, 530 F.3d 538, 541–42 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding that 
land purchaser who alleged a substantive due process violation based on the county 
vendor’s breach of contract failed to state a claim because the prospective land purchaser 
could not show violation of a fundamental right or that available state remedies were 
inadequate); Gen. Auto Serv. Station v. City of Chicago, 526 F.3d 991, 1008 (7th Cir. 
2008) (holding that in order to bring a substantive due process claim, property owner 
must show both a property right and the inadequacy of state remedies to address the 
deprivation before a judge should consider whether the interference with property was 
arbitrary or irrational). 
 94 See Montgomery, 410 F.3d at 939; Taake, 530 F.3d at 541–42. 
 95 See Moore v. Willis Indep. Sch. Dist., 233 F.3d 871, 874–75 (5th Cir. 2000) (stating 
that injuries resulting from corporal punishment do not give rise to substantive due 
process claims if there are adequate state remedies to redress the harm inflicted); Fee v. 
Herndon, 900 F.2d 804, 807–08 (5th Cir. 1990) (acknowledging that corporal punishment 
caused child to spend six months in a psychiatric ward at a cost of $90,000, but holding 
that “injuries sustained incidentally to corporal punishment, irrespective of the severity of 
these injuries or the sensitivity of the student, do not implicate the due process clause if 
the forum state affords adequate post-punishment civil or criminal remedies for the 
student to vindicate legal transgressions”). 
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courthouse door should be closed to substantive due process 
claims.96 
Courts that have dismissed claims based on the existence of 
an adequate state remedy have confused substantive with 
procedural due process.  The Supreme Court, in Parratt v. 
Taylor,97 held that the existence of state tort remedies defeats a 
procedural due process claim where the deprivation is random 
and unauthorized.98  The Court reasoned that in cases involving 
random, unauthorized official misconduct, the state provides all 
the process that is feasible if it affords the individual a post-
deprivation remedy.99  Procedural due process often presents a 
timing question—whether pre- or post-deprivation process is 
necessary—and the impossibility of providing pre-deprivation 
process then defeats the federal claim.  Substantive due process, 
however, does not focus on the state’s failure to provide sufficient 
process.  Rather, it is the raw abuse of power that violates the 
Constitution, and such abuse is unaffected by the existence of 
state remedies. 
Recognizing this distinction, the Supreme Court, in 
Zinermon v. Burch,100 reiterated that substantive due process 
“bars certain arbitrary, wrongful government actions ‘regardless 
of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them.’”101  
Acknowledging that the constitutional violation is complete when 
the wrongful act occurs, the Court stated that state tort remedies 
were irrelevant.102  Nothing in Lewis suggested that Zinermon 
was wrong, nor can Lewis be read to impose this restriction. 
 96 Dacosta v. Nwachukwa, 304 F.3d 1045, 1048–49 (11th Cir. 2002) (finding that a 
battery perpetrated by an instructor upon a college student did not shock the conscience 
and concluding that remedies for this type of battery should be pursued under state tort 
law). 
 97 451 U.S. 527 (1981). 
 98 Id. at 541, 543–44. 
 99 Id. at 543–44. 
 100 494 U.S. 113 (1990). 
 101 Id. at 125 (quoting Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986)). 
 102 Id. at 124–25.  See also Mark R. Brown, De-Federalizing Common Law Torts: 
Empathy for Parratt, Hudson and Daniels, 28 B.C. L. REV. 813, 819 (1987) (“[s]ubstantive 
due process, in contrast [to procedural due process], assesses the propriety of a state’s 
substantive decision. . . . The rationale . . . is that there are certain normative decisions 
the state simply cannot make regardless of the majority’s wishes and regardless of any 
process.”); Irene Merker Rosenberg, A Study in Irrationality:  Refusal to Grant 
Substantive Due Process Protection Against Excessive Corporal Punishment in the Public 
Schools, 27 HOUS. L. REV. 399, 424–37 (1990) (reasoning that state remedies are no more 
relevant to substantive due process claims involving corporal punishment than they are to 
the racially discriminatory application of corporal punishment:  “[I]n Ingraham the state 
criminal and tort remedies were legally relevant only to plaintiffs’ argument that they 
were entitled to a hearing prior to the infliction of appreciable physical pain”). 
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3.  Only Intent to Harm, Malice, or Wantonness Will Shock 
the Conscience 
A third restriction on substantive due process claims 
imposed by the appellate courts deals with the state-of-mind 
requirement.  As explained in County of Sacramento v. Lewis, the 
shocks the conscience standard may sometimes be met when 
government officials act with deliberate indifference to 
constitutional rights.103  The Court cited as examples prison 
guards who were deliberately indifferent to the medical needs of 
pretrial detainees and personnel at a state mental institution 
who failed to provide minimally adequate rehabilitation to those 
who were involuntarily committed.104  However, because 
deliberate indifference implies the opportunity for actual 
deliberation, the Court determined that the standard could not 
reasonably apply to police officers who face a situation calling for 
fast action.  Thus, the Court held that injuries resulting from 
“high-speed chases with no intent to harm suspects physically or 
to worsen their legal plight do not give rise to liability under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.”105 
Relying on Lewis, most appellate courts initially applied a 
deliberate indifference test in non-emergency situations.106  
Recently, however, many courts have held that even where there 
is time to deliberate, if the government official must balance 
competing legitimate interests, the shocks the conscience 
standard must be ratcheted up a notch.  These courts have relied 
on the assertion in Lewis that “[d]eliberate indifference that 
shocks in one environment may not be so patently egregious in 
another.”107  Thus, courts must carefully analyze the specific 
circumstances before condemning an abuse of power as 
 103 County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 850–53 (1998). 
 104 Id. at 849–50 & 852 n.12. 
 105 Id. at 854.  Because the decedent’s family members did not allege that the deputy 
acted with “intent to harm,” they failed to meet the shocks the conscience test. Id. 
 106 See, e.g., Estate of Owensby v. City of Cincinnati, 414 F.3d 596, 602–03 (6th Cir. 
2005) (affirming the application of the deliberate indifference test to a pretrial detainee’s 
claim that he was denied adequate medical treatment; although only six minutes passed 
between the time detainee was taken into custody and the time medical care was 
provided, the officers had adequate time to fully consider the potential consequences of 
their conduct); Bradich v. City of Chicago, 413 F.3d 688, 691–92 (7th Cir. 2005) (reversing 
the district court’s grant of summary judgment to defendants regarding claims that 
members of jail staff acted with deliberate indifference in failing to seek outside 
assistance for ten minutes after finding an arrestee hanging in a jail cell); Hernandez v. 
Tex. Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 380 F.3d 872, 880–81 (5th Cir. 2004) 
(holding that although only the most egregious misconduct will violate substantive due 
process, deliberate indifference standard is met even if the government actor does not 
know of a specific risk to the victim’s health or safety). 
 107 Lewis, 523 U.S. at 850. 
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“conscience shocking.”108  The Court in Lewis characterized the 
situation facing the officers pursuing juveniles on a motorcycle as 
not only one that “call[ed] for fast action,” but also one where the 
deputy faced “obligations that tend[ed] to tug against each 
other.”109  However, it justified the use of an “intent to harm” 
standard based on the unfairness of imposing liability under a 
“deliberate indifference” test in situations where the officials 
truly had no time to deliberate.110  Nonetheless, many courts 
have seized upon this language in Lewis to reject substantive due 
process claims absent evidence of intent to harm. 
For example, in Matican v. City of New York,111 the appellate 
court conceded that “officers had ample opportunity to plan the 
[drug] sting in advance.”112  However, the officers were subject to 
the “pull of competing obligations,” because harm was likely to 
occur no matter what the government officials did.113  Thus, the 
officers’ disclosure to a drug dealer of the confidential informant 
who had set him up could not be said to “shock the contemporary 
conscience.”114  Similarly, although the EPA administrator who 
falsely assured residents that it was safe to return to their homes 
after 9/11 may not have been subject to the same weighty 
concerns that justified the initial decision encouraging workers to 
promptly return to the site,115 she still faced an array of 
competing obligations that precluded a substantive due process 
claim “in the absence of an allegation that the Government 
official acted with intent to harm.”116 
Other appellate courts have similarly rejected the rule that 
“time to deliberate” is the “determining factor” in deciding 
 108 Id. 
 109 Id. at 853. 
 110 Id. 
 111 524 F.3d 151 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 112 Id. at 158. 
 113 Id. at 159 (citing County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 834 (1998)). 
 114 Id. at 158–59.  Cf. Okin v. Vill. of Cornwall-on-Hudson Police Dep’t, 577 F.3d 415, 
431–32 (2d Cir. 2009) (applying the deliberate indifference standard to determine 
whether police officers’ conduct shocked the conscience because “[t]he serious and unique 
risks and concerns of a domestic violence situation are well known and well documented” 
and the officers had “ample time for reflection and for deciding what course of action to 
take in response to domestic violence.”  Further, a reasonable trier of fact could conclude 
that the officers’ conduct demonstrated deliberate indifference to plaintiff’s rights because 
of “the serious implications of [plaintiff’s] complaints over a fifteen-month period,” the 
officers’ “failure to appreciate the gravity of the situation,” and the officers’ conduct could 
not “be explained away by the pull of competing obligations”). 
 115 Benzman v. Whitman, 523 F.3d 119, 127–28 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 116 Id. (emphasis added).  See also Lombardi v. Whitman, 485 F.3d 73, 74–75, 84–85 
(2d Cir. 2007) (“[W]hen agency officials decide how to reconcile competing governmental 
obligations in the face of disaster, only an intent to cause harm arbitrarily can shock the 
conscience in a way that justifies constitutional liability.”). 
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whether deliberate indifference shocks the conscience.117  Several 
courts have held that a higher culpability standard must apply 
both where a state actor must respond in haste and under 
pressure and where the state actor must make a “judgment 
between competing, legitimate interests.”118  Although the need 
to weigh difficult competing concerns may defeat a finding of 
deliberate indifference, a flat rule mandating “intent to harm” is 
contrary to the admonition in Lewis that courts carefully analyze 
specific circumstances in assessing whether “deliberate 
indifference” may be proved.119 
In addition, appellate courts have ratcheted up the intent to 
harm standard to impose an almost impenetrable obstacle.  For 
example, although the Supreme Court has recognized a liberty 
interest on behalf of students to be free from “appreciable 
physical pain,”120 most appellate courts demand some showing of 
intentional malice or sadism to impose liability.  Thus, the Sixth 
Circuit has explained that corporal punishment does not violate 
substantive due process unless the student proves that “‘the force 
applied caused injury so severe, was so disproportionate to the 
need presented, and was so inspired by malice or sadism rather 
than a merely careless or unwise excess of zeal that it amounted 
to a brutal and inhumane abuse of official power literally 
shocking to the conscience.’”121  Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit 
 117 Waybright v. Frederick County, 528 F.3d 199, 206 (4th Cir. 2008).  See also 77 
U.S.L.W. 1207 (U.S. Oct. 7, 2008) (No. 13) (noting the circuit split on this issue). 
 118 Schieber v. City of Philadelphia, 320 F.3d 409, 419 (3d Cir. 2003).  See also Hunt 
v. Sycamore Cmty. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 542 F.3d 529, 542–43 (6th Cir. 2008) (“even 
where the governmental actor is subjectively aware of a substantial risk of serious harm” 
to the plaintiff, and he has time to deliberate about his decision, where “some 
countervailing, mandatory governmental duty motivated that action” and the police face 
agonizing choices, the action will not “shock the conscience” except in “extreme cases”; in 
addition to time to deliberate, courts should examine whether the government actor was 
pursuing a legitimate government purpose that justified taking the risk). 
 119 See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 850 (1998) (“Deliberate 
indifference that shocks in one environment may not be so patently egregious in another, 
and our concern with preserving the constitutional proportions of substantive due process 
demands an exact analysis of circumstances before any abuse of power is condemned as 
conscience shocking.”). 
 120 Ingraham ex rel. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 674 (1977).  The Court 
recognized this liberty interest; however, the plaintiffs pled only procedural, not 
substantive, due process. Id. at 653. 
 121 Ellis ex rel. Pendergrass v. Cleveland Mun. Sch. Dist., 455 F.3d 690, 700 (6th Cir. 
2006) (quoting Webb v. McCullough, 828 F.2d 1151, 1158 (6th Cir. 1987)).  Note, however, 
that the court ruled that a student whose head was slammed against the board, thrown 
on the ground and choked for approximately one minute, resulting in contusions on the 
neck and post-traumatic stress disorder, stated a substantive due process claim against 
her teacher where this action was taken simply because the student forgot to bring a 
pencil to class. Id.  See also Smith v. Half Hollow Hills Cent. Sch. Dist., 298 F.3d 168, 
172–73 (2d Cir. 2002) (emphasizing that not all wrongs perpetrated by school officials 
violate due process and holding that teacher’s slapping of a student could not be fairly 
viewed as so brutal or offensive to human dignity as to shock the conscience); Harris ex 
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requires proof of willful, malicious intent to injure a student, 
regardless of whether there is time to deliberate or whether 
competing interests must be balanced.122 
The imposition of an unnecessarily high threshold in 
corporal punishment cases is unfounded.  It is particularly 
inexplicable when compared to the appellate courts’ treatment of 
substantive due process claims brought by pretrial detainees.  
Many appellate courts permit detainees, unlike students, to 
bring substantive due process claims based on a deliberate 
indifference standard, except in cases involving prison riots 
where there is no time to deliberate.123  The Supreme Court in 
Lewis cited to the detainee cases to support its adoption of the 
intent to harm standard where quick action is required.124  It 
recognized, however, that a deliberate indifference standard 
applies to cases in which detainees challenge the conditions of 
confinement or the failure to protect them from other inmates.125  
Indeed, even convicted felons who bring claims under the Eighth 
Amendment may recover under a deliberate indifference 
standard, albeit one that requires both objective and subjective 
deliberate indifference.126 
rel. Harris v. Robinson, 273 F.3d 927, 930–31 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding that a teacher’s 
disciplinary action was not inspired by malice or sadism so as to demonstrate that degree 
of “outrageousness and a magnitude of potential or actual harm that is truly conscience 
shocking”); Costello v. Mitchell Pub. Sch. Dist. 79, 266 F.3d 916, 919–21 (8th Cir. 2001) 
(holding that student’s allegations that she was called “retarded” and “stupid” in front of 
her classmates and was struck in the face with a notebook by her teacher failed to 
establish that the conduct was sufficiently shocking to state a substantive due process 
claim); Saylor v. Bd. of Educ., 118 F.3d 507, 514–15 (6th Cir. 1997) (holding that teacher’s 
beating of a student, which involved five licks of the paddle on the student’s buttocks, 
causing bruising, was not severe or so inspired by malice or sadism as to shock the 
conscience). 
 122 Davis v. Carter, 555 F.3d 979, 980–81, 984 (11th Cir. 2009) (holding that coach’s 
conduct in depriving student of water after he exhibited signs of overheating and not 
summoning immediate medical care after he collapsed on the football field did not state a 
cause of action under substantive due process because the complaint could not support a 
finding that the coach acted willfully or maliciously with an intent to injure the student; 
deliberate indifference, without more, does not rise to the conscience-shocking level 
required for a constitutional violation). 
 123 See infra note 130. 
 124 Lewis, 523 U.S. at 852–53. 
 125 Id. at 850.  The Court noted:  
Since it may suffice for Eighth Amendment liability that prison officials were 
deliberately indifferent to the medical needs of their prisoners, it follows that 
such deliberately indifferent conduct must also be enough to satisfy the fault 
requirement for due process claims based on the medical needs of someone 
jailed while awaiting trial. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 126 Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837–38 (1994) (holding that inmate must prove 
guard’s actual knowledge that inmate faced a substantial risk of serious harm and yet 
acted with deliberate indifference to this risk).  See also Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 
327 (1986) (holding that convicted inmates who allege excessive force must prove 
“unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain”). 
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On the other hand, detainees bringing substantive due 
process claims have faced other obstacles.  Most appellate courts 
have ignored the Supreme Court’s admonition that a less 
rigorous Due Process, rather than the Eighth Amendment, 
standard applies to pretrial detainees.  Unlike convicted felons, 
who are protected only from “cruel and unusual punishment,” the 
Court has held that pretrial detainees cannot be constitutionally 
subjected to punishment in any manner.127  Further, “if a 
restriction or condition [of pretrial detention] is not reasonably 
related to a legitimate goal—if it is arbitrary or purposeless—a 
court permissibly may infer that the purpose of the governmental 
action is punishment that may not constitutionally be inflicted 
upon detainees qua detainees.”128 
Despite the distinction between pretrial detainees and 
convicted felons drawn by the Supreme Court, most appellate 
courts have required detainees alleging excessive force, 
deliberate indifference to serious medical needs, or 
unconstitutional conditions of confinement, to meet the same 
standard that convicted felons must meet under the Eighth 
Amendment.  Thus, detainees must prove that the deprivation be 
objectively serious, that the prison official be subjectively aware 
of facts from which an inference of substantial risk could be 
drawn, and that the official have a culpable state of mind in the 
sense of subjective criminal recklessness.129  Only a handful of 
 127 Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979).  The Court stated: “if a restriction or 
condition is not reasonably related to a legitimate goal-if it is arbitrary or purposeless-a 
court permissibly may infer that the purpose of the governmental action is punishment 
that may not constitutionally be inflicted upon detainees.” Id. at 539.  See also Graham v. 
Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 n.10 (1989) (acknowledging “that the Due Process Clause 
protects a pretrial detainee from the use of excessive force that amounts to punishment”); 
City of Revere v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983) (reasoning that where there 
has been no “formal adjudication of guilt . . . the Eighth Amendment has no application”). 
 128 Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 539. 
 129 See, e.g., Krout v. Goemmer, 583 F.3d 557, 567–68 (8th Cir. 2009) (holding that 
although the Due Process Clause, not the Eighth Amendment, governs the treatment of 
pretrial detainees, the standard is the same and thus detainee must show he suffered 
from objectively serious medical needs and that correctional officers actually knew of and 
deliberately disregarded those needs); Lewis v. Downey, 581 F.3d 467, 473 (7th Cir. 2009) 
(holding that although pretrial detainees cannot be punished “in any way,” claims of 
deliberate indifference to medical needs are treated the same as Eighth Amendment 
claims brought by convicted inmates); Caiozzo v. Koreman, 581 F.3d 63, 71 n.4 (2d Cir. 
2009) (citing decisions from several circuits holding that the rights of pretrial detainees 
are coextensive with those of convicted inmates and, therefore, the Farmer test governs); 
Martinez v. Beggs, 563 F.3d 1082, 1088–89 (10th Cir. 2009) (holding that pretrial 
detainees challenging the denial of medical attention must meet Eight Amendment 
standards, and even obvious risks may not justify an inference that officials subjectively 
knew of the specific risk of harm and were deliberately indifferent to that risk); Fennell v. 
Gilstrap, 559 F.3d 1212, 1217–20 (11th Cir. 2009) (holding that deputy’s conduct in 
kicking pretrial detainee in the face, which resulted in severe fractures and the necessity 
for surgery, did not constitute excessive force because there was no evidence that deputy 
acted maliciously and sadistically, as required under the Eighth Amendment); 
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decisions recognize the need to distinguish claims brought by 
pretrial detainees who, because they have not yet had a “guilt” 
adjudication, cannot be subject to conditions of confinement that 
are imposed for the purpose of punishment, and who should not 
be required to prove “wanton infliction of pain” in order to 
Klebanowski v. Sheahan, 540 F.3d 633, 639–40 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding that jail officials 
who ignored plaintiff’s request for a transfer after he was beaten and after he pleaded 
that he feared for his life could not be held liable for deliberate indifference to the risk of 
housing gang members with non-gang members because plaintiff could not show officers 
were actually aware of a substantial risk of harm to plaintiff’s safety and yet acted with 
the equivalent of criminal recklessness; detainee never told officials that the attack was 
inflicted by gang members because of his non-gang status, and thus nothing would have 
led officers to believe plaintiff faced this specific threat); Grieveson v. Anderson, 538 F.3d 
763, 771–72, 775, 779 (7th Cir. 2008) (reasoning that although detainee’s claim should be 
analyzed under the Due Process Clause, the inquiry is essentially the same as that under 
the Eighth Amendment, namely, plaintiff must show that jail officials knew the detainee 
faced substantial risk of serious harm and yet they disregarded that risk by failing to take 
reasonable measures to abate it); Phillips v. Roane County, 534 F.3d 531, 539–40 (6th Cir. 
2008) (holding that pretrial detainees asserting a claim of deliberate indifference to 
serious medical needs must meet the Eighth Amendment standard, which requires proof 
that officials actually drew the inference that inmate faced a serious medical risk and 
then disregarded that risk); Burnette v. Taylor, 533 F.3d 1325, 1331–32 (11th Cir. 2008) 
(requiring that plaintiff demonstrate both an awareness of facts from which an inference 
of serious risk could be drawn and evidence that the official actually drew this inference; 
although arresting officers were warned by detainee’s step-father that detainee was 
strung out on drugs, jailer was not deliberately indifferent to serious medical needs of 
pretrial detainee who died after ingesting a lethal combination of drugs while in custody 
in the county jail because, although jailer found the bottle of prescription pills and 
observed that detainee was intoxicated, no one told the jailer that detainee needed 
medical help or observation); Gish v. Thomas, 516 F.3d 952, 954–55 (11th Cir. 2008) 
(holding that to establish liability for pretrial detainee’s suicide while in a police car, 
plaintiff must meet Eighth Amendment standard, which defines deliberate indifference as 
subjective knowledge of the strong likelihood that serious harm will ensue and disregard 
for this risk; although evidence demonstrated that official was aware of detainee’s suicidal 
tendencies, plaintiff produced no evidence that official was aware that the security screen 
in his car might have been unlocked, enabling handcuffed detainee in the rear seat to 
access loaded firearm in the front seat); Butler v. Fletcher, 465 F.3d 340, 344–45 (8th Cir. 
2006) (holding that although the Due Process Clause protects detainees prior to an 
adjudication of guilt, the same Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference standard 
applies to “claims that prison officials unconstitutionally ignored a serious medical need 
or failed to protect [a] detainee from a serious risk of harm”); Gray v. City of Detroit, 399 
F.3d 612, 616 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that pretrial detainee’s right to adequate medical 
treatment is the same as that afforded prisoners under the Eighth Amendment, and thus 
plaintiff must show that defendants acted with deliberate indifference to his suicidal 
behavior and that defendant actually knew detainee was at risk of committing suicide); 
Burrell v. Hampshire County, 307 F.3d 1, 7–8 (1st Cir. 2002) (asserting that although 
pretrial detainees are protected under the Due Process Clause, rather than the Eighth 
Amendment, the standard is the same—namely, a pretrial detainee must demonstrate 
that he was incarcerated under conditions imposing a substantial risk of serious harm 
and that prison officials were deliberately indifferent in that they were subjectively aware 
of facts from which an inference of substantial risk could be drawn and they actually drew 
such an inference); Brown v. Harris, 240 F.3d 383, 388–89 (4th Cir. 2001) (acknowledging 
that regardless of whether plaintiff is a pretrial detainee or convicted felon, the standard 
is the same in assessing deliberate indifference to serious medical needs—the deprivation 
must be objectively sufficiently serious, and the official must have a culpable state of 
mind in the sense of subjective recklessness). 
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establish excessive force.130  Because the Lewis Court adopted the 
loaded shocks the conscience language, it is not surprising that 
the majority of appellate courts have ratcheted up the due 
process standard to parallel that used in adjudicating claims 
brought by convicted inmates.131 
 130 See Lewis v. Downey, 581 F.3d 467, 473–74 (7th Cir. 2009) (holding that the 
standard for excessive force claims brought by detainees is different “because the Due 
Process Clause, which prohibits all ‘punishment,’ affords broader protection than the 
Eighth Amendment’s protection against only punishment that is ‘cruel and unusual’”); 
Hubbard v. Taylor, 538 F.3d 229, 231–32 (3d Cir. 2008) (asserting that pretrial detainee’s 
due process rights are violated where detainees are punished prior to an adjudication of 
guilt, and thus court must determine whether conditions are imposed for the purpose of 
punishment or whether such are but an incident of a legitimate government purpose); 
Phillips, 534 F.3d at 539–42 (finding that district court erred in applying stringent Eighth 
Amendment standard that requires plaintiff to show the existence of a sufficiently serious 
medical need and that defendant actually perceived facts from which to infer a 
substantial risk to the inmate); Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 169 (2d Cir. 2007), rev’d on 
other grounds, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009) (“We explicitly rejected analogies 
to the Eighth Amendment that would require a showing of wantonness on the part of the 
prison official, or a showing that the alleged conditions were so inhumane as to constitute 
cruel and unusual punishment.”) (citations omitted); Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 931 
(9th Cir. 2004) (holding that district court erred in using the Eighth Amendment, rather 
than the substantive due process standard, in judging a claim brought by an individual 
detained while awaiting civil commitment proceedings: “due process requires that the 
nature and duration of commitment bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for 
which the individual is committed”). 
 131 There is also a circuit conflict at the other end of the spectrum, i.e., as to when the 
Fourth Amendment guarantees end for arrestees and detainees, and the less protective 
substantive due process standard begins.  The majority of circuits hold that, at least in 
cases where an arrest is made without a probable cause hearing, the Fourth Amendment 
standard continues to apply.  See Drogosch v. Metcalf, 557 F.3d 372, 378 (6th Cir. 2009) 
(holding that arrestees are protected by the Fourth Amendment until a probable cause 
hearing occurs and only thereafter does due process apply); Williams v. Rodriguez, 509 
F.3d 392, 402–03 (7th Cir. 2007) (holding that claims regarding conditions of confinement 
for pretrial detainees who have not yet had a judicial determination of probable cause are 
governed by the Fourth Amendment’s “objectively unreasonable” standard, which is less 
difficult than the deliberate indifference standard imposed by the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments); Lopez v. City of Chicago, 464 F.3d 711, 719 (7th Cir. 2006) (“the Fourth 
Amendment governs the period of confinement between arrest without a warrant and the 
preliminary hearing at which a determination of probable cause is made, while due 
process regulates the period of confinement after the initial determination of probable 
cause.”); Bryant v. City of New York, 404 F.3d 128, 135–39 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding that 
claims of individuals arrested without a warrant that defendants failed to issue desk 
appearance tickets, thereby prolonging their detention, was governed by the Fourth 
Amendment, which the Supreme Court has held requires a prompt judicial determination 
of probable cause with regard to warrantless arrests; the district court erred in analyzing 
constitutional claims under the substantive due process conscience-shocking test because 
it is well established that the Fourth Amendment governs the procedures applied during 
some period following an arrest); Gibson v. County of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 1197 (9th 
Cir. 2002) (holding that the Fourth Amendment governs claims of excessive force arising 
during a pretrial detention); Wilson v. Spain, 209 F.3d 713, 715–16 (8th Cir. 2000) 
(adopting a “continuing seizure approach,” that Justice Ginsburg developed in Albright v. 
Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 276–81 (1994) (Ginsburg, J., concurring), to hold that a malicious 
prosecution claim should be based on the Fourth Amendment, rather than substantive 
due process); Torres v. McLaughlin, 163 F.3d 169, 174 (3d Cir. 1998) (“Although the 
Supreme Court has repeatedly defined when a Fourth Amendment seizure occurs or 
begins, it has not determined when that seizure ends and Fourth Amendment protections 
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4.  Whose Conscience Must Be Shocked:  Judge or Jury? 
Lewis did not settle the question of who makes the 
determination of what is conscience-shocking behavior, and this 
has led to conflicting decisions in the appellate courts.  For 
example, within the Eighth Circuit, there are cases asserting 
both that this is an issue of law for the judge, and that the issue 
is one for the jury.132  Most appellate courts appear to treat this 
as a jury question,133 permitting the case to go to the jury unless 
no rational jury could find that the conduct was conscience-
shocking.134  Other courts, following the analysis that is used to 
assess the qualified immunity defense,135 recognize that if there 
are questions of fact in need of resolution, these questions should 
no longer apply.”  Acknowledging that the Supreme Court has left that question open, the 
Third Circuit stated: “there may be some circumstances during pre-trial detention that 
implicate Fourth Amendment rights; however we refer to the Fourth Amendment as 
applying to those actions which occur between arrest and pre-trial detention.”); Gaylor v. 
Does, 105 F.3d 572, 574–75 (10th Cir. 1997) (following the Seventh Circuit holding that 
the Fourth Amendment applies between arrest and determination of probable cause, 
while the Fourteenth Amendment controls after probable cause is determined). 
  On the other hand, the Fourth and Fifth Circuits have determined that claims 
brought by pretrial detainees, regardless of whether there has been an arrest pursuant to 
a warrant, are adjudicated under the less protective substantive due process standard.  
See Orem v. Rephann, 523 F.3d 442, 446 (4th Cir. 2008) (holding that the claim of an 
arrestee not formally charged “require[d] application of the Fourteenth Amendment” 
rather than the reasonableness standard of the Fourth Amendment); Hill v. Carroll 
County, 587 F.3d 230, 237 (5th Cir. 2009) (holding that sheriff’s failure to monitor suspect 
who died from positional asphyxiation while being transported in the back of a patrol car 
is governed by substantive due process, not the Fourth Amendment, because the initial 
incidence of the seizure had ended); Brothers v. Klevenhagen, 28 F.3d 452, 456 (5th Cir. 
1994) (holding that a pretrial detainee receives the protection of substantive due process, 
not of the Fourth Amendment). 
 132 Compare Terrell v. Larson, 396 F.3d 975, 981 (8th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (“Because 
the conscience-shocking standard is intended to limit substantive due process liability, it 
is an issue of law for the judge, not a question of fact for the jury.”) with Moran v. Clarke, 
296 F.3d 638, 643 (8th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (“[W]hether the plaintiff has presented 
sufficient evidence to support a claimed violation of a substantive due process right is a 
question for the factfinder, here the jury.”). 
 133 See, e.g., Davis v. Hall, 375 F.3d 703, 719 (8th Cir. 2004) (“[W]hether the 
defendants’ conduct constituted deliberate indifference is a classic issue for the fact 
finder.”); A.M. v. Luzerne County Juvenile Det. Ctr., 372 F.3d 572, 587–88 (3d Cir. 2004) 
(“[W]e believe the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to A.M., is sufficient to 
present a jury question on whether the child-care workers and their immediate supervisor 
were deliberately indifferent to A.M.’s right to security and well-being.”); Walker v. Bain, 
257 F.3d 660, 672 (6th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he jury found that . . . the defendants’ actions did 
not constitute an egregious abuse of power or otherwise shock the conscience.”); United 
States v. Walsh, 194 F.3d 37, 53 (2d Cir. 1999) (“Walsh argues that the District Court 
should have instructed the jury on the ‘shocks the conscience’ standard applicable to due 
process claims under the Fourteenth Amendment . . . .”); Boveri v. Town of Saugus, 113 
F.3d 4, 6–7 (1st Cir. 1997) (“[T]he question is not whether the officers’ decision to dog the 
Honda was sound—decisions of this sort always involve matters of degree—but, rather, 
whether a rational jury could say it was conscience shocking.”). 
 134 See Boveri, 113 F.3d at 6–7. 
 135 See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 816 (1982) (“[q]ualified or ‘good faith’ 
immunity is an affirmative defense that must be  pleaded by a defendant official.”). 
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initially be sent to the jury with the ultimate question of whether 
a substantive due process violation has occurred to be 
determined by the court.136  This line of cases again demonstrates 
that the test enunciated in Lewis has created much uncertainty 
and frustration in the lower federal courts.137 
In short, the test established in Lewis has proved to be 
unworkable.  First, there are conflicting views as to how to 
reconcile the fundamental rights analysis used to contest 
legislation with the shocks the conscience standard used for 
challenging executive misconduct.138  Second, the circuits 
disagree as to whether the existence of state remedies defeats the 
federal claim.139  Third, the circuits are divided as to when 
deliberate indifference, as opposed to an intent to harm standard, 
must be met.140  Fourth, there is confusion as to how the test is 
satisfied, depending on who the litigant is.  With regard to 
pretrial detainees, most courts use a stringent Eighth 
Amendment deliberate indifference test.141  With regard to 
students alleging excessive corporal punishment, only an intent 
to harm that demonstrates ill will, malice or sadism is deemed to 
shock the conscience.142  With regard to government employees, 
 136 See Armstrong v. Squadrito, 152 F.3d 564, 577 (7th Cir. 1998) where the court 
stated: 
[T]he question of whether the defendants’ conduct constituted deliberate 
indifference is a classic issue for the fact finder. . . . [B]ecause this question is a 
factual mainstay of actions under § 1983, we do not believe it should receive 
consideration as a question of law.  Any concern about allowing the fact finder 
to determine a constitutional question is ameliorated by the overlap between 
this inquiry and the third step in our analysis—an examination of the totality 
of the circumstances—which is a question of law.  
Id.  See also Luckes v. County of Hennepin, 415 F.3d 936, 940 (8th Cir. 2005) (stating that 
determining whether conduct “shocks the conscience” is a question of law); Terrell v. 
Larson, 396 F.3d 975, 981 (8th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (“Because the conscience-shocking 
standard is intended to limit substantive due process liability, it is an issue of law for the 
judge, not a question of fact for the jury.”); Crowe v. County of San Diego, 359 F. Supp. 2d 
994, 1030 (S.D. Cal. 2005) (stating that the determination of whether defendants’ conduct 
“shocks the conscience” is an issue of law for the court); Tun ex rel Tun v. Ft. Wayne 
Cmty. Sch., 326 F. Supp. 2d 932, 945 (N.D. Ind. 2004) (determining whether conduct 
“shocks the conscience” is a question of law); Mason v. Stock, 955 F. Supp. 1293, 1308–09 
(D. Kan. 1997) (“[T]he ‘shocks the conscience’ determination is not a jury 
question. . . . Under the rules pertaining to summary judgment, a plaintiff who wishes to 
assert a Collins’ claim must, at minimum, point to conduct or policies which would 
require the court to make a ‘conscience shocking’ determination.”). 
 137 At a conference on June 9, 2009, sponsored by the Federal Judicial Center, I 
discussed this substantive due process issue with district court judges and magistrates.  
Several expressed concern about the judge-jury question, particularly their discomfort in 
applying their own vision of what is conscience-shocking behavior with few guidelines 
from the United States Supreme Court or from their individual circuits. 
 138 See supra Part I.D.1. 
 139 See supra Part I.D.2. 
 140 See supra Part I.D.3. 
 141 See supra note 129 and accompanying text. 
 142 See supra notes 121–22 and accompanying text. 
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most appellate courts will not recognize any substantive due 
process challenge to a termination or other adverse employment 
action because of the absence of a fundamental right.143  Yet, as 
noted, substantive due process challenges to land use decisions 
and excessive punitive damage awards have not been subjected 
to the “fundamental rights” requirement.144  Finally, there is 
disagreement as to who should decide whether government 
misconduct is conscience-shocking.145 
II.  WHY LEWIS SHOULD BE OVERTURNED 
The Lewis Court erred in creating a false dichotomy between 
challenges to executive and legislative action and in imposing a 
restrictive and untenable shocks the conscience standard.  
Although stare decisis mandates that Supreme Court decisions 
not be lightly rejected, it is also clear that “[s]tare decisis is not 
an inexorable command.”146  Generally, the Court asks (1) 
whether reliance interests are involved; (2) whether the 
reasoning has been questioned by subsequent decisions; and (3) 
whether the rule has proved to be unworkable.147  All of these 
factors weigh in favor of reconsidering the Lewis holding. 
First, this is not a situation where “reliance” is an issue.  
Government officials have not “relied” on a promise that they 
may engage in wrongdoing with impunity provided their 
behavior is not conscience-shocking.  Second, its reasoning has 
often been challenged.  As discussed in Part I, the Justices in 
Lewis were deeply divided.  The majority determined for the first 
time in 1998 that substantive due process jurisprudence should 
depend on whether executive or legislative action is being 
challenged and that only conscience-shocking behavior rises to 
the level of a substantive due process violation.148  Four of the 
concurring Justices challenged both the dichotomy as well as the 
new test.  Justice Souter, who authored the opinion, conceded 
that “the measure of what is conscience-shocking is no calibrated 
yardstick,”149 and the concurring opinion of Justice Scalia, joined 
by Justice Thomas, as well as Justice Kennedy’s concurrence, 
 143 See supra notes 81–83 and accompanying text. 
 144 See supra notes 84–85 and accompanying text. 
 145 See supra Part I.D.4. 
 146 State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20 (1997). 
 147 See, e.g., Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 816–17 (2009); Planned Parenthood 
of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854–55 (1992).  See also Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 
808, 829–30 (1991) (stating that where a decision has “been questioned by Members of the 
Court in later decisions and [has] defied consistent application by the lower courts,” these 
factors weigh in favor of reconsideration). 
 148 County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846–48 (1998). 
 149 Id. at 847. 
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joined by Justice O’Connor, attacked its subjectivity.150  Further, 
this section will explore subsequent Supreme Court decisions 
that have implicitly rejected its analysis.  Third, as discussed in 
Part I.D, the decision has led to considerable confusion and 
numerous circuit splits in the last decade since its 
pronouncement.  It has clearly proved to be an unworkable test. 
In addition to exploring contrary Supreme Court precedent, 
the next section critiques Lewis as contrary to public originalism.  
Further, the Court’s purported justification—a concern for not 
permitting substantive due process to become a “font of tort 
law”—is revealed as both ill conceived and exaggerated. 
A. The Court’s Weakened Protection Against Abuse of 
Executive Power Is Contrary to the Historical 
Understanding of the Due Process Clause 
Although substantive due process jurisprudence has been 
subjected to a consistent sharp attack, it is well accepted that it 
stems from Magna Carta.151  In a recent article providing an 
originalist defense of substantive due process as a limitation on 
legislative power, Professor Frederick Mark Gedicks traces the 
development of Magna Carta and “higher-law” constitutionalism 
as the foundation for the widely shared understanding of the Due 
Process Clause in the late eighteenth century.152  He explains 
that although Magna Carta initially may have been intended to 
reach only the procedures that the king used to deprive citizens 
of their rights, Sir Edward Coke reinvigorated the provision in 
the seventeenth century to attack the royal power of the Stuart 
Kings—a substantive limitation on executive power.153 
The American colonies relied upon “Coke’s reading of 
substance into due process” to challenge the conduct of the 
British king during the American Revolution.154  Further, the 
 150 Id. at 861 (Scalia, J., concurring) (sarcastically describing the standard as “the ne 
plus ultra, the Napoleon Brandy, the Mahatma Ghandi, the Cellophane of subjectivity”) 
(paraphrasing Cole Porter, You’re the Top (1934)); id. at 857 (Kennedy, J., concurring) 
(opining that shocks the conscience “has the unfortunate connotation of a standard laden 
with subjective assessments” and, therefore, “must be viewed with considerable 
skepticism”).  See also supra notes 69–73 and accompanying text. 
 151 See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
 152 Frederick Mark Gedicks, An Originalist Defense of Substantive Due Process:  
Magna Carta, Higher-Law Constitutionalism, and the Fifth Amendment, 58 EMORY L.J. 
585 (2009). 
 153 Id. at 598–99. 
 154 Id. at 595.  Professor Gedicks explains that “[r]evolutionary Americans adopted 
these propositions wholesale, and carried them into independence and beyond.” Id. at 657.  
Professor Gedicks concedes that “[i]t is less clear whether Coke really thought that the 
law of the land bound Parliament,” but he concludes that revolutionary Americans 
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ratification controversy over the Constitution’s lack of a Bill of 
Rights reflected this same understanding of “higher-law” 
constitutionalism.  Those who argued against adoption of a Bill of 
Rights asserted that an enumeration of rights was unnecessary 
because higher-law constitutionalism already protected “natural 
and customary rights,” thus rendering enumeration in a written 
constitution superfluous.155 
Applying either an originalist perspective that focuses on 
those who framed and ratified the substantive due process 
guarantee, or a public-meaning originalism that looks to the 
public meaning at the time it was drafted and ratified, it is clear 
that the Due Process Clause was understood as a limitation on 
the arbitrary use of executive power.156  Coke “equated the law of 
the land with the due process of law,” and “understood both to 
have imposed substantive limitations on actions of the king.”157  
Because the Supreme Court has acknowledged that Magna Carta 
is the source of modern day substantive due process, and because 
it is well accepted that, at a minimum, Magna Carta, as 
originally understood and as developed by Sir Edward Coke in 
the seventeenth century, was a limitation on executive power,158 
it is counterintuitive to interpret substantive due process as 
providing less protection for arbitrary executive acts that violate 
natural or customary rights than for legislative acts. 
B. Supreme Court Precedent both Before and After Lewis 
Conflict with Its Analysis 
As discussed in Part I, the Supreme Court in Rochin, the 
source of the shocks the conscience test, did not suggest a 
different treatment of substantive due process challenges to 
executive action, as opposed to legislative enactments.159  
Further, the shocks the conscience language was merely one of 
several descriptive phrases used by Justice Frankfurter to 
explain why the introduction of evidence obtained through 
believed that substantive due process was a limitation on legislative power, as well as 
executive power. Id. 
 155 Id. at 634–38. 
 156 Id. at 656–57. 
 157 Id. at 657. 
 158 Professor Gedicks contends that Sir Edward Coke’s notion of “higher law” 
constitutionalism was understood as limiting parliamentary lawmaking as well as the 
Crown’s prerogatives. Id. at 598–608.  Key opponents of this broad interpretation of 
substantive due process and Magna Carta argue that Magna Carta was intended as a 
limitation only on the king and his agents, because no parliament or other legislative 
entity existed in early thirteenth century England.  See Raoul Berger, “Law of the Land” 
Reconsidered, 74 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 18–20, 24, 30 (1979). 
 159 See supra notes 34–35 and accompanying text. 
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pumping someone’s stomach violated substantive due process.160  
Finally, the sparse citations in Lewis did not support its 
conclusions.161 
Notably, at the time Lewis was decided, the Supreme Court 
did not follow this legislative/executive dichotomy in assessing 
violations of other constitutional rights.  In fact, in cases 
involving both “takings” and equal protection claims, the Court 
acknowledged the need to be more, not less, vigilant of 
executive/administrative decisions because of the greater risk of 
arbitrary decision making.  For example, in Allegheny Pittsburgh 
Coal Co. v. County Commission,162 the Court unanimously 
invalidated a county tax assessor’s practice of valuing real 
property at fifty percent of its most recent sale price.163  Since 
property would not be reassessed until it was again sold, 
properties with identical values would have widely divergent 
assessments depending on the timing of the sales.164  Although 
reiterating the basic principle that the judiciary generally applies 
a highly deferential equal protection analysis to distinctions 
drawn in tax laws, the Court found, nonetheless, that the county 
assessor’s practices were arbitrary.165  Therefore, landowners 
were denied the equal protection of the law.166  A few years later, 
in Nordlinger v. Hahn,167 the Court upheld a California statute 
that limited property taxes and permitted reassessment only 
when sold, thereby resulting in the same property tax disparities 
challenged in Allegheny.168  Nonetheless, the Court held the law 
was rationally related to a legitimate government purpose.169  
The only difference in the two cases was the Court’s greater 
willingness to review the practices of the tax assessor as opposed 
to a tax statute enacted by the legislature. 
The Supreme Court has recognized this same heightened 
concern for arbitrary executive decision making in its takings 
cases.  In Dolan v. City of Tigard,170 the Court acknowledged that 
a land regulation generally must be upheld if it “substantially 
advances legitimate state interests and does not deny an owner 
economically viable use of his land.”171  However, it reasoned that 
 160 See supra notes 32–33 and accompanying text. 
 161 See supra notes 36–43 and accompanying text. 
 162 488 U.S. 336 (1989). 
 163 Id. at 338. 
 164 Id. at 344. 
 165 Id. at 345. 
 166 Id. at 345–46. 
 167 505 U.S. 1 (1992). 
 168 Id. at 5, 18. 
 169 Id. at 12. 
 170 512 U.S. 374 (1994). 
 171 Id. at 385 (citing Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)). 
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when city officials make “an adjudicative decision to condition 
petitioner’s application for a building permit on an individual 
parcel,” the deferential approach used to assess legislative 
determinations “classifying entire areas of the city,” is 
inappropriate.172  Instead, such decisions are subject to a test 
that mandates an “essential nexus” between a “legitimate state 
interest” and the permit condition exacted by the city, and “rough 
proportionality” between the exaction and the projected impact of 
the proposed development.173  Justice Scalia’s rationale for this 
strict test was the greater need for courts to be wary of 
adjudicative decisions by administrative officials that affect 
individual landowners, as compared to legislative determinations 
that classify whole areas of the city, such as zoning laws.174 
The Court’s contrary position with regard to substantive due 
process confounds the question of a constitutional rights violation 
with the question of liability.  Arguably legislation represents an 
act of the government, making entity liability more justifiable.175  
In contrast, executive misconduct may be an isolated act that is 
difficult to control.  However, the entire purpose of § 1983 is to 
hold individuals who act under color of state law accountable for 
their unconstitutional misconduct.  Section 1983 already provides 
numerous mechanisms that significantly limit entity, as well as 
individual, liability for damages.176  The critical question is 
whether the official has arbitrarily deprived persons of liberty or 
property.  If so, the guarantee of substantive due process has 
been breached. 
The Court’s unwillingness to hold executive officials liable 
for substantive due process violations also stands in sharp 
contrast to the law of immunity that governs § 1983 litigation.  
The Court has acknowledged that government officials who 
engage in legislative conduct enjoy absolute immunity from 
liability, whereas members of the executive branch have only 
qualified immunity.177  Indeed, the same year that the Court in 
Lewis granted greater protection for executive misconduct, it 
ruled in Bogan v. Scott-Harris,178 that legislative acts should be 
 172 Id. at 385. 
 173 Id. at 386, 391. 
 174 Id. at 391 n.8.  See also Michael L. Wells & Alice E. Snedeker, State-Created 
Property and Due Process of Law:  Filling the Void Left by Engquist v. Oregon 
Department of Agriculture, 44 GA. L. REV. 161, 191–92 (2009) (reasoning that because 
legislation is enacted by a group, it is less likely to be based on ill motive, and because it 
usually affects many people in the same way, there is an inherent “check on abusive 
legislation” and less “need for judicial oversight”). 
 175 See infra note 223. 
 176 See infra notes 217–22 and accompanying text. 
 177 See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807 (1982). 
 178 523 U.S. 44 (1998). 
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given greater deference because “the exercise of legislative 
discretion should not be inhibited by judicial interference or 
distorted by the fear of personal liability.”179  Legislative 
decisions, even if made by executive officers, i.e., the mayor in 
Bogan, are shielded by absolute immunity, whereas executive 
decisions trigger only qualified immunity.180  The Court 
distinguished decisions that have broad prospective implication, 
where there is less likelihood of abuse of power, from those that 
apply only to a particular individual, where the decision may be 
characterized as “executive,” rather than legislative.181  The 
Court’s interpretation and development of immunity doctrine 
recognizes the greater need to rein in abuses of executive power. 
As to substantive due process claims, the Supreme Court in 
recent years has neither consistently adhered to the 
executive/legislative dichotomy nor to the shocks the conscience 
test.  Two opinions from 2003 are illustrative.  In City of 
Cuyahoga Falls v. Buckeye Community Hope Foundation,182 
developers sued the city challenging the city engineer’s refusal to 
issue a building permit until a referendum petition—which called 
for repeal of a municipal housing ordinance authorizing 
construction of a low-income housing complex—could be 
submitted.183  The developer alleged violations of the Fair 
Housing Act, equal protection, and substantive due process.184  
The latter claim was discussed in a brief paragraph, citing Lewis 
for the proposition that “the city engineer’s refusal to issue the 
permits while the petition was pending in no sense constituted 
egregious or arbitrary government conduct.”185  Blatantly omitted 
 179 Id. at 52. 
 180 Id. at 55.  See also Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807 (1982) (“[F]or executive 
officials in general, however, our cases make plain that qualified immunity represents the 
norm.”). 
 181 Id. at 55–56.  The lower federal courts have recognized this same distinction 
between broad policymaking decisions that are legislative in character and decisions that 
apply to a specific party, which are viewed as executive and not shielded by immunity.  
See, e.g., Thornton v. City of St. Helens, 425 F.3d 1158, 1163–64 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding 
that a city manager and a city planner did not enjoy legislative immunity from a claim 
that they improperly delayed processing a wrecking-yard owner’s applications for city 
approval of his license renewal because processing an individual application is not a 
legislative function); Bryan v. City of Madison, 213 F.3d 267, 273 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding 
that a mayor’s repeated vetoes of a developer’s site plans and the use of delay tactics to 
prevent approval of the plans were not protected by legislative immunity because the 
decisions did not involve broad policymaking); Corn v. City of Lauderdale Lakes, 997 F.2d 
1369, 1392 (11th Cir. 1993) (distinguishing the promulgation of zoning ordinance and 
general moratoriums on development plans, which trigger absolute immunity for local 
legislators, from land use decisions that simply apply policy to a specific party and thus 
are not insulated by legislative immunity). 
 182 538 U.S. 188 (2003). 
 183 Id. at 191–93. 
 184 Id. at 193. 
 185 Id. at 198. 
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from the opinion was the shocks the conscience language.  
Although the Court cited Lewis for the proposition that “only the 
most egregious official conduct can be said to be ‘arbitrary in the 
constitutional sense,’”186 the next sentence explained that the 
challenged mandate to deny the permits while the petition was 
pending “represented an eminently rational directive,”187 thereby 
creating confusion in the appellate courts as to whether land use 
regulation decisions should be analyzed under the legislative 
(rational basis) or executive (shocks the conscience) test.188 
More significantly, in Chavez v. Martinez,189 a three-Justice 
plurality analyzed a challenge to executive action under both the 
fundamental rights strand and the shocks the conscience strand 
of substantive due process, and six Justices agreed that the 
fundamental rights strand applied to claims involving executive 
action.190  Martinez was being treated for gunshot wounds 
received during an altercation with police when Chavez, a patrol 
supervisor, began interrogating him without providing a 
Miranda warning.191  Because Martinez was never charged with 
 186 Id. (quoting County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 823, 846 (1998)). 
 187 Id. at 198–99. 
 188 See, e.g., Shanks v. Dressel, 540 F.3d 1082, 1088–89 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Lewis 
and Cuyahoga Falls for the principle that when executive action is challenged only 
“egregious” conduct can be said to be “arbitrary in the constitutional sense”; thus, land 
decisions that rest on an erroneous legal interpretation or that violate state law do not 
give rise to a substantive due process violation unless there is evidence that a decision 
reflects malice, bias, or pretext); Chainey v. Street, 523 F.3d 200, 220 (3d Cir. 2008) 
(holding that allegations of improper motive are insufficient absent evidence of 
corruption, self-dealing, or additional facts that suggest “conscience-shocking behavior”); 
Clark v. Boscher, 514 F.3d 107, 112–13 (1st Cir. 2008) (holding that run-of-the-mill land-
use decisions, such as the denial of permits, generally do not rise to the level of behavior 
that shocks the conscience and such is limited to “truly horrendous situations”); Ferran v. 
Town of Nassau, 471 F.3d 363, 369–70 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that although town’s use of 
a landowner’s parcel as a turnaround for its snow plows and its paving of a road that 
encroached on the property was “incorrect and ill-advised,” it was not the type of 
conscience-shocking, outrageous behavior that implicates substantive due process).  Other 
appellate courts have used the shocks the conscience test even in challenges to zoning 
ordinances.  See Koscielski v. City of Minneapolis, 435 F.3d 898, 902–03 (8th Cir. 2006) 
(holding that zoning ordinance that restricted where firearms dealerships could be located 
did not violate substantive due process since this mandate is not “so egregious or 
extraordinary as to shock the conscience”).  Cf. A Helping Hand, L.L.C. v. Baltimore 
County, 515 F.3d 356, 372–73 (4th Cir. 2008) (upholding jury instruction that stated that 
a substantive due process violation could be found if the decision to shut down methadone 
clinic operator based on a county zoning ordinance was “clearly arbitrary and 
unreasonable, with no substantial relationship to a legitimate governmental purpose”; the 
court reasoned that this was a valid statement of the law even though other cases 
articulated a different, more stringent substantive due process test). 
 189 538 U.S. 760 (2003). 
 190 Justice Thomas wrote the opinion, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice 
Scalia, which examined whether a fundamental right was implicated. Id. at 775.  Justice 
Kennedy, in an opinion joined by Justices Stevens and Ginsburg, argued that the police 
conduct implicated a fundamental liberty interest. Id. at 796, 799. 
 191 Id. at 764. 
Do Not Delete 4/13/2010 9:20 PM 
2010] Time to Bury the Shocks the Conscience Test 341 
a crime, the answers elicited during the interrogation were never 
used against him in any criminal proceeding.192  As a result, 
Justice Thomas concluded that the Fifth Amendment’s Self-
Incrimination Clause did not apply to this situation.193 
Proceeding to examine the claim under substantive due 
process, Justice Thomas invoked Lewis and Rochin for the 
proposition that “unauthorized police behavior . . . might ‘shock 
the conscience’ and give rise to § 1983 liability.”194  After 
determining that the officer’s conduct was not “conscience 
shocking,” the plurality recognized that the Due Process Clause 
also protects “fundamental liberty interests . . . unless the 
infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state 
interest.”195  Although holding that freedom from unwanted 
police questioning was not a fundamental right,196 the plurality 
engaged in a fundamental rights analysis despite the fact that 
the case involved a challenge to executive, not legislative, 
action.197  Further, in a concurring opinion, Justice Stevens 
stated that “[t]he Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment protects individuals against state action that either 
‘shocks the conscience,’ or interferes with [fundamental] rights 
‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.’”198 
The significance of the two-prong analysis in Chavez has not 
been lost on the lower courts.  For example, the Tenth Circuit 
invoked Chavez to challenge a district court ruling that 
improperly “compartmentali[zed]” substantive due process based 
on whether the government conduct complained of was 
“executive” or “legislative.”199  Although conceding that Lewis 
appeared to create an executive/legislative distinction, the court 
explained that “an overly rigid demarcation between the two 
lines of cases is neither warranted by existing case law nor 
helpful to the substantive analysis.”200  The court, perhaps 
somewhat disingenuously, asserted that the Supreme Court in 
Lewis did not “establish an inflexible dichotomy.”201  Further, it 
 192 Id. 
 193 Id. at 766. 
 194 Id. at 774 (citing County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 850 (1998)). 
 195 Id. at 774–75. 
 196 Id. at 776. 
 197 Id. at 775–76. 
 198 Id. at 787 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citation omitted) 
(emphasis added). 
 199 Seegmiller v. Laverkin City, 528 F.3d 762, 767 (10th Cir. 2008). 
 200 Id. 
 201 Id. at 768.  Most appellate courts have interpreted Lewis to require different 
treatment of executive and legislative action.  See Dias v. City & County of Denver, 567 
F.3d 1169, 1182–84 (10th Cir. 2009) (holding that the district court erred in applying a 
“shocks the conscience” test to plaintiff’s challenge to a pit bull ordinance because this 
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reasoned that rejecting the dichotomy “makes good sense, for the 
distinction between legislative and executive action is ancillary 
to the real issue in substantive due process cases: whether the 
plaintiff suffered from governmental action that either (1) 
infringes upon a fundamental right, or (2) shocks the 
conscience.”202  A total of six Justices agreed in Chavez that the 
fundamental rights strand of substantive due process applied to 
claims involving executive action,203 thus negating any “hard-
and-fast rule requiring lower courts to analyze substantive due 
process cases under only the fundamental rights or shocks the 
conscience standards.”204 
In short, the Supreme Court in Lewis manufactured a false 
dichotomy between legislative and executive misconduct that had 
not been used in prior cases, and it imposed a draconian shocks 
the conscience test that has led to nothing but mischief in the 
appellate courts.  Further, the Court itself, in Chavez, ignored 
the rigid dichotomy.  The next section explores why the Court’s 
inquiry is reserved for cases challenging executive, not legislative, action); Martin v. St. 
Mary’s Dep’t Soc. Servs., 346 F.3d 502, 511 (4th Cir. 2003) (citing the Lewis dichotomy as 
mandating use of “shocks the conscience” test to evaluate all executive action); Putnam v. 
Keller, 332 F.3d 541, 547 (8th Cir. 2003) (applying the Lewis dichotomy between 
legislative and executive action to assess whether challenged conduct by campus officials 
violated substantive due process); Leebaert v. Harrington, 332 F.3d 134, 139 (2d Cir. 
2003) (noting that there is a different standard for determining arbitrary action 
depending upon whether the action is executive or legislative); Hawkins v. Freeman, 195 
F.3d 732, 738 (4th Cir. 1999) (commenting that there are different tests for determining 
whether an executive or legislative act is “fatally arbitrary”; however, because the facts 
could be interpreted as either an executive or legislative act, the court proceeded to 
evaluate plaintiff’s claim under both standards). 
 202 Seegmiller, 528 F.3d at 768.  See also United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 
(1987), discussed supra notes 38–39 and accompanying text.  Cf. Bowers v. City of Flint, 
325 F.3d 758, 764 (6th Cir. 2003) (Moore, J., concurring) (while agreeing that plaintiff 
failed to state a viable substantive due process claim, concurring opinion advised that a 
three-step substantive due process analysis should be used, wherein the court first 
considers whether the asserted interest constitutes a fundamental right and, if so, strict 
scrutiny is applied; second, the court determines whether the conduct shocks the 
conscience; third, if the conduct does not shock the conscience, the court considers 
whether the conduct is rationally related to a legitimate state interest). 
 203 A three-Justice plurality analyzed executive conduct under both the fundamental 
rights strand and the shocks-the-conscience strand of substantive due process. Chavez, 
530 U.S. at 775.  Three additional Justices: Kennedy, Stevens, and Ginsburg, employed a 
fundamental rights analysis in their concurring opinions. Id. at 783, 789, 799. 
 204 Seegmiller, 528 F.3d at 768.  In this case, an officer was reprimanded for her off-
duty sexual conduct and the court asserted that her substantive due process claim could 
be established either by identifying a fundamental right or by demonstrating that the 
conduct shocks the conscience. Id. at 764, 767.  Ultimately, the court decided that plaintiff 
failed under both approaches. Id. at 769.  The Supreme Court similarly rejected the rigid 
two-tier approach to substantive due process analysis of legislative claims, opting instead 
for a more nuanced balancing approach.  See discussion of Lawrence v. Texas, supra note 
9 and accompanying text.  Further, the Court in State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. 
Campbell developed a multi-factor test for determining when punitive damage awards are 
so arbitrary as to violate substantive due process. See discussion of State Farm, supra 
notes 11–12 and accompanying text. 
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justification for treating executive misconduct differently, namely 
a concern for transforming constitutional litigation into a “font of 
tort law,” is ill conceived and exaggerated. 
C. Overlap with Tort Law Does Not Justify Restricting the 
Substantive Due Process Guarantee 
The Supreme Court, in Lewis, explained its rationale for the 
executive/legislative distinction and the shocks the conscience 
test as follows: “[E]xecutive action challenges raise a particular 
need to preserve the constitutional proportions of constitutional 
claims, lest the Constitution be demoted to what we have called a 
font of tort law.”205  Several lower appellate courts have relied on 
this rationale to demand truly conscience-shocking behavior in 
order to survive dismissal of a substantive due process claim.206  
Others have barred substantive due process claims unless the 
litigant establishes the inadequacy of state tort remedies.207 
The overlap with state tort remedies should not determine 
the fate of federal constitutional violations.  The Supreme Court 
is clearly driven by a concern that § 1983 not be used to supplant 
traditional tort law, despite federalism concerns.208  However, in 
Monroe v. Pape,209 the Supreme Court held that the federal 
remedy for vindicating constitutional deprivations under § 1983 
supplements state remedies.210  Indeed, the whole purpose of 
§ 1983 was to interpose the federal courts between the states and 
the people and to provide greater protection for constitutional 
 205 County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 848 n.8 (1998).  The “font of tort 
law” language first appeared in a Supreme Court decision addressing a procedural due 
process claim brought by a litigant who was branded an active shoplifter in a flyer 
circulated by the police chief. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 695–96, 701 (1976).  The Court 
explained that the procedural due process challenge “would appear to state a classical 
claim for defamation actionable in the courts of virtually every State.” Id. at 697.  The 
Court opined that permitting a Due Process Clause claim “would make of the Fourteenth 
Amendment a font of tort law to be superimposed upon whatever systems may already be 
administered by the States.” Id. at 701.  See also Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 282 
(1980) (observing that each state has a paramount interest “in fashioning its own rules of 
tort law”); William Burnham, Separating Constitutional and Common-Law Torts:  A 
Critique and a Proposed Constitutional Theory of Duty, 73 MINN. L. REV. 515, 544 (1989) 
(alleging that many due process claims are merely state tort actions “masquerading” as 
civil rights suits). 
 206 See, e.g., Christensen v. County of Boone, 483 F.3d 454, 464–65 (7th Cir. 2007) 
(reasoning that “Lewis calls for judicial modesty in implementing a federal program of 
constitutional torts” and mandates that official misconduct, which may be harmful and 
unjustified by any legitimate interest, must be left to “ordinary tort litigation” unless it 
can be characterized as truly conscience-shocking). 
 207 See supra Part I.D.2. 
 208 Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 332–33 (1986) (quoting Paul, 424 U.S. at 701). 
 209 365 U.S. 167 (1961), overruled in part on other grounds by Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. 
Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 664–65 (1978). 
 210 Id. at 183. 
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rights.211  Until or unless § 1983 is repealed or amended, it 
should not be interpreted contrary to its historic purpose.  
Further, liability for the arbitrary abuse of power by executive 
branch officials should not be relegated to the vagaries of state 
tort law.  Several constitutional scholars have noted the illogic 
and danger of limiting the substantive scope of constitutional 
rights based on the existence of state torts.212 
A related argument developed by Professor Richard H. 
Fallon, Jr. contends that substantive due process should serve 
only as a check on legislative enactments that have a broad 
impact on society, rather than to correct individual injustices 
that can be vindicated through individual tort actions.213  On the 
other hand, it can be argued that the judicial invalidation of laws 
raises greater concerns regarding federalism and judicial 
activism.  As Justice Scalia has opined, “‘[i]n a democratic society 
legislatures, not courts, are constituted to respond to the will and 
consequently the moral values of the people.’”214  It is when the 
judiciary strikes down democratically enacted laws that it 
“thwarts the will of representatives of the actual people.”215  In 
 211 Id. at 171–72. 
 212 See Robert Chesney, Old Wine or New?  The Shocks-the-Conscience Standard and 
the Distinction Between Legislative and Executive Action, 50 SYRACUSE L. REV. 981 (2000).  
Chesney noted:  
[I]t makes little sense to define the scope of a constitutional right with 
reference to the availability of tort remedies . . . merely on the ground that the 
federal civil damages remedy through which the right might be asserted 
appears to overlap with tort concepts. . . . [D]efining the range of constitutional 
protections in the context of alleged executive infringements by reference to the 
apparently undesirable convergence of tort and constitutional law tailors the 
remedy poorly to the perceived problem.  If convergence with ‘mere’ tort law is 
the problem, then a response specific to the federal civil damages action 
vehicles . . . is appropriate[.] 
Id. at 1013–14; Daniel O. Conkle, Three Theories of Substantive Due Process, 85 N.C. L. 
REV. 63, 94 (2006) (arguing that substantive due process “serves a nationalizing function” 
because “[w]hen the Court recognizes substantive due process rights, they are national 
rights that every state and locality must honor”); Christina Brooks Whitman, 
Emphasizing the Constitutional in Constitutional Torts, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 661, 661 
(1997) (contending that attempts to prevent overlap with state tort law have resulted in 
decisions that limit the substantive scope of constitutional rights: “[t]he danger posed by 
focusing on the way in which § 1983 damage actions against state officials . . . are like or 
unlike tort actions is that problems raised by specific remedies will drive thinking about 
constitutional substance”). 
 213 Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Some Confusions About Due Process, Judicial Review, and 
Constitutional Remedies, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 309, 327 (1993).  See also The Supreme 
Court, 1997 Term—Leading Cases, 112 HARV. L. REV. 122, 199 (1998) (“[S]ubstantive due 
process analysis is on its firmest footing when applied to systematic governmental 
action.”). 
 214 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 616 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Gregg 
v. Georgia, 428 U.S 153, 175 (1976)). 
 215 See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH:  THE SUPREME 
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16–18 (1962) (describing judicial review as a “deviant 
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contrast, when plaintiffs use substantive due process to remedy 
arbitrary abuses of government power by its officials, no harm 
befalls democratically enacted laws.  When a member of the 
executive branch violates a constitutional duty and deprives an 
individual of life, liberty, or property, a judicial remedy does not 
undermine democracy.  When judges and jurors determine that 
government officials have engaged in arbitrary behavior, no 
plausible counter-majoritarian difficulty exists.  Further, 
Professor Fallon’s distinction ignores the reality that actions of 
law enforcement officials, government employers, government 
educators, and other members of the executive branch may have 
a significant and broad corrosive impact, thereby raising the 
same systemic concerns triggered by legislative action.216 
The allegation that recognizing “constitutional torts” will 
cause a deluge of federal litigation and government liability is 
also highly exaggerated.  The Supreme Court has already made 
it clear that plaintiffs cannot base a substantive due process 
claim on mere inaction, i.e., failing to protect individuals from 
acts of violence or dangerous situations that the government did 
not create.217  Further, the Supreme Court has protected against 
vexatious, frivolous litigation by awarding fees to prevailing 
defendants pursuant to the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards 
Act of 1976,218 as well as by imposing sanctions under Rule 11 of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.219  Together with recent 
institution” in American democracy and coining the phrase “counter-majoritarian 
difficulty” to describe the tension he perceived). 
 216 See infra note 278. 
 217 DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 197 (1989).  
The Court reasoned that unless government officials, by an affirmative exercise of power, 
restrain an individual’s liberty, rendering him unable to protect himself, there is no cause 
of action under the Due Process Clause. Id. at 201.  This narrow view of substantive due 
process has been challenged by many constitutional scholars. See, e.g., Susan Bandes, The 
Negative Constitution:  A Critique, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2271, 2273 (1990) (arguing that when 
“conclusory incantation[s]”—such as “[g]overnmental inaction is not actionable”—allow so 
many harms “to flourish unchecked by the Constitution,” then “the language, and the 
concepts it describes, must be scrutinized with care”).  See also Rosalie Berger Levinson, 
Reining in Abuses of Executive Power Through Substantive Due Process, 60 FLA. L. REV. 
519, 536–41 (2008) (demonstrating how many lower federal courts have refrained from 
finding a “custodial relationship,” which would trigger a duty to protect, or a state-created 
danger, thereby rendering DeShaney a formidable obstacle). 
 218 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2006).  The statute provides that “the court, in its discretion, 
may allow the prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs.” 
§ 1988(b).  Where the defendant prevails, fees may be awarded where the suit is 
“vexatious, frivolous, or brought to harass or embarrass the defendant.” Hensley v. 
Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429 n.2 (1983). 
 219 Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that an attorney who 
signs “a pleading, written motion, or other paper” thereby certifies that “the factual 
contentions have evidentiary support” and that the claims are “warranted by existing law 
or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law.” FED. 
R. CIV. P. 11(b). 
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Supreme Court decisions permitting more effective use of 
motions to dismiss220 and summary judgment procedures,221 
weak cases are disposed at the earliest stages of litigation.  In 
addition, the doctrines of absolute and qualified immunity, which 
safeguard individual officials, significantly mitigate damage 
liability.222  Finally, the Supreme Court’s rejection of the doctrine 
of respondeat superior in § 1983 litigation insulates government 
entities from monetary liability unless a policymaker’s conduct is 
challenged or a custom or policy is established.223 
In light of these significant safeguards and limitations on 
liability, the concerns raised by the Court in Lewis are 
exaggerated, as well as unfounded.  Federal courts should not be 
reluctant to recognize substantive due process claims where the 
plaintiff demonstrates arbitrary deprivation of a property or 
liberty interest.  Executive branch officials, no less than 
legislators and judges imposing punitive damage awards, should 
be liable for substantive due process violations in order to permit 
this historic guarantee to play a vital role in remedying abuses of 
government power. 
Another key rationale for constricting the use of substantive 
due process is the concern, voiced by several Justices, about 
 220 In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1953 (2009), the Court extended Bell Atlantic 
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007), to apply to all civil actions.  To survive a 
motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must now allege sufficient factual matter to “state a claim to 
relief that is plausible on its face.”  Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949.  The Court explained that 
judges should reject “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported 
by mere conclusory statements” and that “a court considering a motion to dismiss can 
choose to begin by identifying pleadings that, because they no more than conclusions, are 
not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id. at 1949–50.  In addition, Iqbal rejected the 
supervisory liability theory, which allowed supervisors to be held liable for the 
constitutional violations of their subordinates if there was evidence of knowledge and 
acquiescence.  The majority stated that “the term ‘supervisory liability’ is a 
misnomer . . . each Government official . . . is only liable for his or her own misconduct.” 
Id. at 1949.  The dissent lamented that the majority eliminated the broader 
understanding of supervisory liability that governed prior to this ruling. Id. at 1957–58 
(Souter, J., dissenting). 
 221 See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986) (holding that to avoid 
summary judgment an opposing party must show a “genuine issue as to any material 
fact” that impinges upon a decisive question of law); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 
U.S. 242, 248, 251–52 (1986) (holding that to survive summary judgment, the non-movant 
must present a “genuine factual dispute”—i.e., one that “presents a sufficient 
disagreement to require submission to a jury”). 
 222 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 806–08 (1982) (stating that absolute immunity 
extends to judges, legislators, and prosecutors performing their duties as well as executive 
officials when they engage in legislative, judicial, or prosecutorial functions, whereas 
qualified immunity shields most executive officials from damage liability unless they 
violate clearly established law). 
 223 Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978) (“[I]t is when execution of a 
government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts 
or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the 
government as an entity is responsible under § 1983.”). 
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judicial activism in an area where there are few objective 
guideposts.  Opponents complain that allowing substantive due 
process challenges means that judges, based only on their own 
subjective preferences, will second-guess executive or 
administrative decisions.224  Arguably, the largely undefined 
labels “arbitrary” and “capricious” can be attached to all sorts of 
government misconduct, potentially creating an undue strain on 
federal judicial resources as well as on state-federal relations.225  
However, the Court’s adoption of the shocks the conscience test 
has not eliminated the vagueness or subjectivity problems.  
Responding to this criticism, Part III proposes a new test to guide 
lower courts in determining when executive misconduct is 
sufficiently arbitrary to rise to a constitutional level. 
III.  PROPOSED STANDARD FOR ASSESSING SUBSTANTIVE DUE 
PROCESS ABUSE OF POWER CLAIMS 
In assessing whether government misconduct violates 
substantive due process, courts should return to the “essence of 
substantive due process,” which is “protection of the individual 
from the exercise of governmental power without reasonable 
justification.”226  Focusing on this core question reveals the 
fallacy of Lewis and its progeny, including the tests the appellate 
courts have developed to further emasculate the meaning of 
substantive due process.  More specifically, I propose four 
underlying principles that should govern substantive due process 
analysis and then explicate a new approach. 
First, the legislative/executive dichotomy established in 
Lewis and the imposition of a more restrictive shocks the 
conscience test for executive misconduct should be rejected.  The 
 224 See, e.g., Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992) (“[G]uideposts 
for responsible decisionmaking in this uncharted area are scarce and open-ended.”); 
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 507–13 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting) (challenging 
substantive due process as a mechanism whereby Supreme Court Justices may interject 
their own predilections and determine what they believe to be fair); Gumz v. Morrissette, 
772 F.2d 1395, 1404–06 (7th Cir. 1985) (Easterbrook, J., concurring) (asserting that 
“[s]ubstantive due process is a shorthand for a judicial privilege to condemn things the 
judges do not like or cannot understand”) overruled on other grounds by Lester v. Chicago, 
830 F.2d 706 (7th Cir. 1987). 
 225 See Justices Scalia’s and Kennedy’s descriptions of the shocks the conscience test, 
supra note 150.  But see the majority opinion in County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 
833, 847 (1998) (“While the measure of what is conscience shocking is no calibrated yard 
stick, it does, as Judge Friendly put it, ‘poin[t] the way.’” (quoting Johnson v. Glick, 481 
F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir. 1973)). 
 226 See Christensen v. County of Boone, 483 F.3d 454, 468–69 (7th Cir. 2007) (Ripple, 
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis omitted) (arguing that the 
majority erred in failing to recognize that government officials who act unreasonably and 
who use their positions “not in connection with any official duty but for [their] own 
purposes” have abused their power contrary to the guarantee of substantive due process). 
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question of whether government officials abuse their power 
should not depend on whether they are members of the executive, 
legislative, or judicial branch of government.227 
Second, rejection of the shocks the conscience standard 
should include elimination of a rigid intent to harm, wantonness, 
malice, or sadism test.228  Arbitrary abuse of power should not be 
insulated by imposing draconian burdens of proof on the victims.  
Although negligent misconduct may not be viewed as an 
unconstitutional abuse of power, the Supreme Court in Lewis 
recognized that government officials who act with deliberate 
indifference to the serious harm their actions might cause, have 
breached the constitutional guarantee of due process.229  
Although the Court opted for an intent to harm standard in 
emergency situations where there is no time to deliberate,230 the 
Court’s carefully constructed exception does not justify the broad 
use of the sadism, wantonness, and malice standards for 
students and detainees who bring substantive due process 
claims.231 
Third, the conclusion reached by some appellate courts that 
substantive due process protects only fundamental rights should 
be rejected.  As discussed, this fundamental rights restriction has 
permitted courts to dismiss claims involving significant property 
and liberty interests.232  The Fourteenth Amendment does not 
say that government cannot deprive persons of a “fundamental 
right”; rather, it prohibits all deprivations of “life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law.”233  The Supreme Court has 
acknowledged that the scope of “liberty” protected by the Due 
Process Clause is broad: “[A] rational continuum 
which . . . includes a freedom from all substantial arbitrary 
impositions and purposeless restraints . . . .”234 
The Supreme Court has never repudiated the broad 
definition of “liberty” first enunciated in the 1920s as 
encompassing a wide range of interests “recognized at common 
law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free 
men.”235  The Court’s opinion in Lawrence v. Texas236 implicitly 
 227 See supra Parts II.A and B. 
 228 See supra Part I.D.3. 
 229 See supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
 230 See supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
 231 See supra notes 121–22, 129 and accompanying text. 
 232 See supra Part I.D.1. 
 233 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 234 Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (quoted in Moore 
v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 502 (1977) (plurality opinion)). 
 235 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). 
 236 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
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recognized this “continuum approach.”  The majority failed to 
follow the strict fundamental-rights analysis that the Court 
enunciated in Glucksberg.237  Lawrence is noteworthy because, 
under Glucksberg, where no fundamental right is implicated, 
legislative enactments are presumed valid and will be struck 
down only if totally arbitrary and capricious.238  Nonetheless, the 
Court in Lawrence invalidated Texas’ sodomy law as arbitrarily 
interfering with the liberty interests of individuals to enter into 
personal relationships.239 
Many constitutional scholars have suggested that Lawrence 
marked the demise of Glucksberg’s strict two-tier analysis.240  
Although post-Lawrence decisions have not demonstrated a sea 
change,241 lower courts that have interpreted Glucksberg to 
preclude any review of executive misconduct absent a 
fundamental right are misguided.  They ignore the “second tier” 
of the Glucksberg analysis and thereby deprive litigants of the 
opportunity to show that they have been subjected to 
“substantial arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints.”242  
Although government interference with property and liberty 
normally will not trigger strict scrutiny, this should not mean 
 237 Id. at 586, 588 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority’s failure to 
articulate any standard of review).  See also Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68, 72–73 
(2000) (plurality opinion) (applying a “combination of several factors” to hold that a state’s 
visitation statute, as applied, unconstitutionally infringed on parents’ fundamental right 
to rear their children); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 874 (1992) 
(applying an “undue burden” test, rather than strict scrutiny or rational basis, in 
assessing the constitutionality of state abortion laws); Russ v. Watts, 414 F.3d 783, 789 
(7th Cir. 2005) (noting the confusion between different Supreme Court approaches to 
substantive due process analysis, including Glucksberg’s fundamental rights analysis, the 
Lewis “shocks the conscience” test, and Troxel’s “combination of factors” test). 
 238 See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 722 (1997). 
 239 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567.  Justice Kennedy asserted that “[l]iberty presumes an 
autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate 
conduct.” Id. at 562.  He concluded that the Texas statute furthered “no legitimate state 
interest which can justify its intrusion into the personal and private life of the 
individual.” Id. at 578. 
 240 Conkle, supra note 212, at 65 (contending that Lawrence “includes untapped 
insights . . . that might inform a substantial reconceptualization and reformation of 
substantive due process”); Gregory P. Magarian, Substantive Due Process as a Source of 
Constitutional Protection for Nonpolitical Speech, 90 MINN. L. REV. 247, 285 (2005) 
(“Lawrence dramatically shifted the tide, reinvigorating substantive due process both by 
sharpening the doctrine’s affirmative rationale and by tightening the restrictions it 
imposes on government regulation.”).  See also Randy E. Barnett, Justice Kennedy’s 
Libertarian Revolution:  Lawrence v. Texas, in CATO SUPREME COURT REVIEW: 2002–2003 
21, 41 (James L. Swanson ed., 2003) (recognizing Lawrence as a case adopting a 
Libertarian interpretation of the Constitution that creates a “presumption of liberty” 
whereby all laws that restrict “liberty” are presumptively unconstitutional); Laurence H. 
Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas:  The “Fundamental Right” That Dare Not Speak Its Name, 117 
HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1899 (2004) (“Lawrence significantly altered the historical trajectory 
of substantive due process . . . .”). 
 241 See supra note 9. 
 242 See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
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that government officials, including those in the executive 
branch, may violate “non-fundamental” rights with impunity. 
Fourth, a focus on abuse of power demonstrates the 
irrelevance of the existence of state remedies.  Many appellate 
courts have erroneously rejected claims brought by students, 
landowners, and government employees based on the availability 
of state tort remedies.243  As has been explained, the existence of 
state remedies has relevance with regard to some procedural due 
process claims, but not substantive due process claims.244  
Clearly this criterion has nothing to do with the level of 
arbitrariness of the constitutional deprivation and thus should be 
rejected. 
Once these four principles are understood, the question of 
what is an unconstitutional abuse of power can be assessed by 
borrowing from the Supreme Court’s analysis of substantive due 
process challenges to legislative or judicial power, as well as 
appellate court decisions that have struggled with this question.  
The following sections set forth a proposed standard. 
A. Strict Scrutiny for the Deprivation of Fundamental Rights 
Where fundamental rights are implicated, federal courts 
should follow the Supreme Court’s lead in Chavez, which 
analyzed a challenge to executive power under both the 
fundamental rights strand and the shocks the conscience 
strand.245  In Chavez, the Court ignored the strict dichotomy 
imposed in Lewis and instead recognized that the violation of 
fundamental rights, whether by legislative or executive action, 
triggers strict scrutiny.246  In determining whether a Supreme 
Court decision should be reversed, one key factor is whether the 
legal foundations of the decision have been eroded by subsequent 
rulings.  Lewis itself was a deeply divided decision, and the 
dichotomy that it created between legislative and executive 
decisions was eroded by the Chavez opinion.247 
B. A Nuanced Balance Test for Substantive Due Process Claims 
Not Implicating Fundamental Rights 
Because the Supreme Court has been reluctant to expand 
the category of fundamental rights and has indeed narrowed the 
 243 See supra Part I.D.2. 
 244 See supra notes 97–102 and accompanying text. 
 245 See supra notes 189–98 and accompanying text. 
 246 See supra note 195 and accompanying text. 
 247 See supra notes 199–202 and accompanying text (discussing appellate courts that 
have interpreted Chavez as eliminating this rigid dichotomy). 
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scope of recognized rights,248 adopting a strict scrutiny analysis 
for the deprivation of fundamental rights, with no meaningful 
check on the deprivation of non-fundamental interests, provides 
insufficient protection against abuses of government power.  
Further, the Supreme Court has not consistently followed 
Glucksberg’s strict two-tier substantive due process analysis,249 
which ultimately depends on how broadly or narrowly the 
Justices decide to characterize the liberty or property interest.250  
For example, in Michael H. v. Gerald D.,251 a biological father 
challenged a California law that created an irrebuttable 
presumption that a married woman’s husband was the father of 
her child.252  The Court ruled that a biological father who had 
established a relationship with the child had no right to a 
hearing to determine paternity and that he could be denied all 
parental rights.253  Justice Scalia, however, asserted that the 
specific liberty interest implicated was the alleged right of a 
father to have a relationship with a child who is conceived as a 
result of an adulterous relationship with a married woman—a 
right that has not traditionally been recognized and thus cannot 
be viewed as fundamental.254  Justice Brennan, in dissent, 
argued that it was well established that fathers have a 
 248 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846, 874 (1992) (describing 
the right to terminate a pregnancy as a liberty interest, not a fundamental right, and 
abandoning strict scrutiny in favor of an “undue burden” test, which permits, prior to 
viability of the fetus, state regulation that does not unduly burden the abortion decision). 
 249 In addition to Casey, see District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2817–22 
(2008) (holding that the right to possess a handgun in one’s home for self-defense is 
protected by the Second Amendment, but then reasoning that “[u]nder any of the 
standards of scrutiny” applied to enumerated rights, the ordinance in question failed to 
pass constitutional muster; the Court did not define the right as fundamental, nor did it 
apply strict scrutiny analysis); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (recognizing a 
liberty interest in intimate homosexual relationships, but neither asserting fundamental-
rights status nor the need to apply strict scrutiny); Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66–67 
(2000) (requiring that parental rights be given significant weight in deciding visitation 
matters, but not using strict scrutiny language); Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 
U.S. 261, 278–80 & n.7 (1990) (recognizing a liberty interest in refusing unwanted 
medical treatment but not denominating this interest as a fundamental right that 
necessarily triggered strict scrutiny and, instead, balancing the competing interests). 
 250 See Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf, Levels of Generality in the Definition of 
Rights, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1057, 1058 (1990) (“The selection of a level of generality 
necessarily involves value choices.”); Mark Tushnet, Can You Watch Unenumerated 
Rights Drift?, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 209, 216 (2006) (contending that “questions about 
unenumerated rights are questions about the level of abstraction on which we are to 
understand constitutional language” and that “there is no analytic basis for selecting one 
rather than another level of generality or specificity”). 
 251 491 U.S. 110, 113 (1989). 
 252 Id. at 113. 
 253 Id. at 124–27. 
 254 Id. at 127 (majority opinion). 
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fundamental right to have a relationship with their biological 
children.255 
The same characterization problem surfaced in Lewis where 
officers killed a youth on a motorcycle during a high-speed 
chase.256  The liberty interest could be defined broadly as 
implicating the fundamental right to life, as Justice Kennedy 
did,257 or, more narrowly, as a “right to be free from ‘deliberate or 
reckless indifference to life in a high-speed automobile chase 
aimed at apprehending a suspected offender,’” which Justice 
Scalia found was not rooted in history or tradition and thus not 
protected under substantive due process.258 
Borrowing from the Supreme Court’s more recent 
substantive due process decisions, which have eschewed the 
strict two-tier analysis established in Glucksberg,259 courts 
should apply a balance test that examines certain key factors 
that relate directly to whether an abuse of power has occurred.  
First, courts should assess the nature and significance of the 
interests at stake and the extent to which these interests have 
been violated, as the Supreme Court did in Lawrence, Troxel, and 
Heller.260  Second, in determining arbitrariness, a critical factor 
should be whether the government’s action is a substantial 
departure from professional judgment.  The Supreme Court 
adopted this standard to determine whether executive officials 
violated the substantive due process rights of those involuntarily 
committed to its mental institutions.261  There is no reason why 
public school officials, jailers, and government employers should 
not be held to a similar standard of “professionalism.” 
Third, borrowing from the Supreme Court’s analysis of 
arbitrary punitive damage awards, courts should examine the 
reprehensibility of the government official’s misconduct,262 which 
the Court has held is “the most important indicium of the 
 255 Id. at 141–45 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 256 County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 836 (1998). 
 257 Id. at 856 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 258 Id. at 862–63 (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting id. at 836 (majority opinion)).  See 
also Dist. Attorney’s Office v. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. 2308 (2009).  Whereas the majority 
characterized plaintiff’s § 1983 claim as a “freestanding right to access DNA evidence for 
testing,” which is not rooted in history, the dissent called this a “fundamental 
mischaracterization” of the liberty interest, and instead framed the claim as the “most 
elemental” liberty right to be “free from physical detention by one’s own government.” Id. 
at 2322–23, 2331, 2334 (quoting Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004)). 
 259 See supra note 249.  See also cases which have read Lawrence to require a 
balancing test, supra note 9. 
 260 See supra note 249. 
 261 See supra note 43 and accompanying text. 
 262 See supra note 11–12 and accompanying text. 
Do Not Delete 4/13/2010 9:20 PM 
2010] Time to Bury the Shocks the Conscience Test 353 
reasonableness of a punitive damages award.”263  
Reprehensibility measures culpability and callousness, which are 
directly relevant to whether a constitutional abuse of power has 
occurred.  In State Farm, the Court set forth the following 
considerations regarding reprehensibility: 
Whether . . . the harm caused was physical as opposed to economic; 
the tortious conduct evinced an indifference to or a reckless disregard 
of the health or safety of others; the target of the conduct had 
financial vulnerability; the conduct involved repeated actions or was 
an isolated incident; and the harm was the result of intentional 
malice, trickery, or deceit, or mere accident.264 
The first consideration suggests that a defendant who causes 
physical harm, i.e., who deprives a plaintiff of liberty rather than 
property, often acts more callously than a defendant who causes 
economic harm.  The second mirrors the deliberate indifference 
or reckless disregard test that generally governs substantive due 
process claims.  The third—financial vulnerability of the victim—
may have little relevance in most substantive due process claims, 
but is highly relevant to culpability when broadened to include 
an inquiry into whether the defendant targeted especially 
“vulnerable” victims, such as students or detainees.  Finally, the 
fourth and fifth criteria are clearly indicia of abuse of power since 
repeated actions or those inspired by malice or deceit indicate the 
unreasonableness and arbitrariness of the defendant’s conduct.265  
This does not mean that evidence of malice or sadism is required 
to demonstrate a substantive due process violation.  Indeed, any 
categorical “intent to harm” test insufficiently protects individual 
liberty.266 
 263 See supra note 11; State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 419 
(2003); BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575 (1996). 
 264 State Farm, 538 U.S. at 419. 
 265 In a more recent punitive damages case, Philip Morris U.S.A. v. Williams, 127 S. 
Ct. 1057 (2007), the Court held that the trial court improperly rejected a jury instruction 
regarding the allowable use of evidence of harm to non-parties in assessing punitive 
damages.  The Court reasoned that a jury may not use punitive damages to directly 
punish the defendant for harm caused to non-parties to the litigation, but it may consider 
this harm in determining reprehensibility. Id. at 1065.  The Court cast its decision as a 
procedural due process case, id., but it can be argued that the Court’s focus on amount of 
harm as an indication of reprehensibility may also have implications for substantive due 
process challenges.  See Jeremy T. Adler, Comment, Losing the Procedural Battle but 
Winning the Substantive War:  How Philip Morris v. Williams Reshaped Reprehensibility 
Analysis in Favor of Mass-Tort Plaintiffs, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 729, 743 (2009) (arguing 
that “even though Philip Morris was a procedural due process decision, the Court’s 
conception of reprehensibility should be equally applicable to substantive due process 
challenges to punitive damages judgments”).  The Court stated that “conduct that risks 
harm to many is likely more reprehensible than conduct that risks harm to only a few.” 
Phillip Morris, 127 S. Ct. at 1065.  This would be an important criterion in cases such as 
Lewis that involved a high-speed chase, which posed a significant risk of harm to others. 
 266 See supra notes 228–31 and accompanying text. 
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In assessing reprehensibility, courts should also look to the 
mitigating factors raised in Lewis, such as whether the 
government officials had to act in haste or whether they had time 
to deliberate.267  Further, where government officials are forced 
to weigh conflicting legitimate interests, this should be taken 
into account.268  However, unlike Lewis and the appellate courts’ 
interpretation of Lewis, these factors should not lead inexorably 
to imposition of an intent to harm standard.  Rather, they should 
be viewed as just two of several relevant criteria in assessing the 
reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct.   
An example will help illustrate the significance of this new 
substantive due process analysis.  In Christensen v. County of 
Boone,269 plaintiffs asserted that a police officer, acting out of a 
personal vendetta, engaged in “a pattern of on-duty conduct 
designed to harass, annoy, and intimidate” plaintiff and his 
girlfriend.270  The couple alleged that the officer repeatedly 
followed them while they were driving, that he parked his squad 
car in front of the girlfriend’s place of employment, and that he 
sat in his police car outside of businesses that the plaintiffs were 
visiting.271  The Seventh Circuit reasoned that even if a 
fundamental right to intimate association was at stake, the claim 
failed because the adverse consequences of the officer’s actions 
were not sufficiently serious: “[o]fficial conduct that represents 
an abuse of office . . . violates the substantive component of the 
due process clause only if it ‘shocks the conscience.’”272  The court 
stressed that “Lewis calls for judicial modesty in implementing a 
federal program of constitutional torts . . . leaving to ordinary 
tort litigation conduct of the sort in which Deputy Krieger is 
alleged to have engaged.”273  Even if unjustified by any legitimate 
government interest, the claim was not actionable.274 
One dissenting judge recognized that the majority’s approach 
ignored the essence of substantive due process, namely 
“protection of the individual from the exercise of governmental 
power without reasonable justification.”275  Relying on Justice 
Kennedy’s concurrence in Lewis, Judge Ripple asserted that 
courts should examine the objective character of the conduct to 
 267 See supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
 268 See supra notes 107–18 and accompanying text. 
 269 483 F.3d 454 (7th Cir. 2007). 
 270 Id. at 457. 
 271 Id. 
 272 Id. at 464. 
 273 Id. at 464–65. 
 274 Id. at 465. 
 275 Id. at 468 (Ripple, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis 
omitted). 
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determine whether such is consistent with traditions, precedents, 
and the historical meaning of the Constitution.276  Judge Ripple 
explained that this was a situation where the official 
embarked upon a scheme of retaliation against the plaintiffs in which 
he used the power and authority of his office to injure their 
relationship.  This systematic vendetta had no conceivable legitimate 
governmental purpose.  It amounted to the raw use of the power—
power that comes with a badge, a service revolver, and the power to 
arrest—in order to make it difficult for this couple to maintain a 
romantic relationship that our constitution protects as a fundamental 
right.277 
Judge Ripple believed that a fundamental right was at stake 
and he concluded that this perverse use of police authority 
shocked the judicial conscience and sent a dangerous message to 
law enforcement personnel.278  Under the approach suggested in 
this Article, deprivations of fundamental rights would 
automatically trigger strict scrutiny, as they do for legislative 
enactments.  However, if the court failed to recognize a 
fundamental right to maintain a romantic relationship or found 
that the challenged conduct did not infringe on that right, it 
would then weigh the importance of the right and the extent of 
the infringement, whether the officer’s conduct was a substantial 
departure from professional judgment, and the reprehensibility 
of the conduct.  Applying these factors, a substantive due process 
violation is apparent.  First, even if the right is not 
“fundamental,” the liberty interest is significant, and “stalking” 
constitutes a significant impairment of the interest.  Second, the 
officer’s conduct was a substantial departure from professional 
police conduct.  Third, the conduct could readily be described as 
reprehensible.  It interfered with personal liberty, it involved 
repeated actions, and there was evidence of ill will and an intent 
to harm.  Further, the officer was not facing exigent 
circumstances nor was he forced to weigh competing legitimate 
government interests.  In short, the officer’s conduct was a raw 
 276 Id. 
 277 Id. at 469. 
 278 Id.  Judge Ripple opined:  
Today’s decision also will have a very practical and harmful effect on municipal 
governance throughout this circuit.  The panel majority’s failure to recognize 
the situation here as a willful abuse of governmental power and its failure to 
characterize the conduct as conscience shocking will have a direct and 
immediate effect on efforts to maintain discipline and professionalism in the 
countless number of small municipal police forces that dot our 
landscape. . . . Today, the highest federal court in this region of the United 
States sends a surely unintended, but nevertheless unwelcome, message that 
minimizes the significance of a raw use of municipal police power. 
Id. at 469–70. 
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abuse of government power unjustified by any government 
interest and thus a clear violation of substantive due process.  
The Seventh Circuit’s contrary conclusion demonstrates why 
Lewis’ shocks the conscience test must be overturned.  Although 
other cases may mandate a more nuanced balance of competing 
considerations, the criteria identified in this proposal will provide 
judges with guideposts that are lacking under Lewis. 
CONCLUSION 
Historically, substantive due process has been interpreted as 
a guarantee against arbitrary deprivations of life, liberty, or 
property, whether perpetrated through legislative enactments or 
by the misconduct of government officials.  The Supreme Court 
broadly defined the term “liberty” to deter and punish abuses of 
government power.  In Lewis, however, the Court significantly 
gutted the Due Process Clause by creating a false dichotomy 
between legislative and executive misconduct and by imposing a 
draconian shocks the conscience standard.  The problem has been 
compounded by appellate court decisions holding that the judicial 
conscience will not be shocked absent evidence of malice, sadism, 
or wantonness.  Further, the appellate courts have imposed 
additional obstacles that have no relevance to the question of 
whether an abuse of power has occurred, such as the 
requirement that plaintiffs establish deprivation of a 
fundamental right or prove there is no state remedy for the 
injury.  Lewis’ shocks the conscience test and its progeny should 
be rejected in favor of an approach that restores the Due Process 
Clause to its historical position as a core guarantor against raw 
abuse of power by members of all three branches of government. 
 
